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The Grass Will Not Be Trampled
Because the Tigers Need Not Fight - New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for
Detente Across the Taiwan Strait
Markus G. Puder*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the relationship between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic,
and explores whether the German experience may contain
lessons for the relations between the People's Republic of China
and Taiwan.
The Author's analysis of the German situation begins with
a discussion of the relations between the separate German
states, with a particularemphasis on how that relationshipwas
shaped by the Basic Treaty. That document provided for the

* Markus G. Puder, Ph.D., is an attorney and researcher in the Environmental
Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory, Washington, D.C. Office. He
also serves as an adjunct professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center.
Dr. Puder is a member of the New York Bar and the U.S. Supreme Court Bar. In
addition, he has obtained the right to practice law in the Federal Republic of Germany.
1.
This is a free variation of the traditional Chinese proverb "the grass will be
trampled when tigers fight." For the metaphor of the tigers, see, for example, Robb M.
LaKritz, Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a Theory of Legal Development in
Post-Mao China, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 237 (1997) (predicting that the People's
Republic of China will become the new tiger); Omar Saleem, The Spratley Islands
Dispute: China Defines the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INV'L L. REV. 527, 535 n.35
(2000) (applying the term to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan); see also
Angeline G. Chen, Taiwan's InternationalPersonality: Crossing the River by Feeling
the Stones, 20 LOY. LA INVL & COMP. L.J. 223 (1998) (invoking the image of dragons
in the context of Taiwan's creation myth).
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promotion of peaceful relations, recognition of independence
and sovereignty of each nation, as well as a normalizationof the
diplomatic relations. After ratification, the Bavarian State
Government sought a declarationthat the ratificationlaw was
incompatible with the Basic Law, which conceived of Germany
as one nation. The German Federal Constitutional Court
unanimously rejected the petition,finding that the Basic Treaty
was compatible with the Basic Law. The Author examines the
Court's methods of analysis, as well as the ramifications of the
Court's decision.
The Author then turns to an examination of the relations
between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. He
recognizes that the People's Republic of China advocates the
One-China principle for achieving a peaceful reunification
between the mainland and Taiwan.
By contrast, the
government of Taiwan maintains that China has been split into
two separate and independent states with divergent political
and economic systems.
The Author notes that such divergent viewpoints had
plagued German rapprochement. Once the parties moved past
their disagreements, however, the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic were able to launch a
viable partneringmechanism that increased the permeability of
the inner-German border,facilitated German-Germandialogue,
and alleviated the hardships of division. The Author suggests
that the Chinese affinity for treaty frameworks in the context of
legal and political arrangements may be harnessed for
increased levels of interaction in social, economic, trade, and
other venues. Furthermore, the Author contends, the success of
the Basic Treaty has illustrated how increasing contacts and
decreasingtensions can effectively enhance the relationship.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................
FLASHBACK: THE DtTENTE PARADIGM OFFERED
BY THE BASIC TREATY .....................................................

A.
B.

General Content...................................................
Legal ChallengeBefore the Federal
ConstitutionalCourt ...........................................
1.
The Petitions ..........................................
2.
The Holding ............................................
a.
Admissibility .............................
b.
Substance ..................................
c.
Observations .............................

483

488
488
491
491
491
491
493
499

20011
IlI.

DETENTE ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

SNAPSHOT: THE CROSS-STRAIT STALEMATE .................

IV.

The Position of the Government of the
People's Republic of China..................................
B.
The Positionof the Taiwanese Government.......
C.
Discussion............................................................
OUTLOOK THE PATH FORWARD ....................................

506

A.

506
510
513
522

I. INTRODUCTION'

On July 9, 1999, in an interview with the German Radio Station
Deutsche Welle, the former President of Taiwan-the Republic of
China (hereinafter Taiwan), Lee Teng-hui, characterized "cross-strait
relations [between Taipei and Beijing] as ... at least a special stateto-state relationship."3 These remarks sparked a flurry of reactions,
including vehement criticisms from the Government of the People's
Republic of China, 4 subsequent clarifications by officials from

2.
The views as well as the translations of German legal sources and terms
offered in this article are strictly those of the Author as a private individual.
3.
For a full transcript of the interview, see Interview of Taiwan President Lee
Teng-hui with Deutsche Welle Radio (July 9, 1999), at httpJlwww.taiwandc. orglnws9926.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) (asserting that (1) Taiwan cannot be considered a
"renegade province" because of "historical and legal viewpoints"; (2) the People's
Republic of China on the Chinese mainland has never ruled the sovereign state
Republic of China and its territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu; (3)
Taiwanese constitutional amendments have "designated cross-strait relations as a...
special state-to-state relationship"; and (4) the concept of "one country, two systems" is
not suitable for Taiwan); see also Seth Faison, Taiwan President Implies His Island Is
Sovereign State, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at Al; Michael Laris, Taiwan Jettisons
"One China"Formula,WASH. POST, July 13, 1999, at A14.
4.
E.g., China's Military Indignant Over Taiwan Leader's Remarks, CHINA
DAILY, July 14, 1999, at httpJwwv.chinedaily.com.cnhighlightsftaiwan/7152.htm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2001) (emphasizing the indignation of the People's Liberation Army);
FM Spokesman on Lee Teng-Hui's SeparatistRemarks, CHINA DAILY, July 12, 1999, at
http-J/www.chinadaily.com.cnhighlightsltaiwan/7153.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001)
(providing the remark by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu Bangzao that "Lee
has gone too far on the dangerous road of playing with fire"); Reunification Congress
Deputies Criticize Taiwan Leader's Remarks, CHINA DAILY, July 15, 1999. at
httpJ/www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/taiwan/7163.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001)
(printing the proposition that Lee "would be a sinner if he does not immediately stop
traveling down this road"); see also Jeff Jacoby, The End of "One China," BOSTON
GLOBE, July 19, 1999, at A15 (reporting verbiage advanced by the Government of the
People's Republic of China that "any plot to challenge the 'One-China' principle... %,.ill
fail. . . [and President Lee is] a criminal of the nation who will leave a stink for a
thousand years").
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Taiwan, 5 and mixed pronouncements from different players in the
6
United States.
Dr. Lee Teng-hui's locution connotes a pattern molded by the
late Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Willy Brandt
(1968-74), who, against significant domestic resistance, based his
policy of d~tente (Entspannungspolitik) on accepting the former
German Democratic Republic as an equal.7 After the completion of
Germany's integration into the Western institutional, economic, and
security frameworks that had dominated the Adenauer era, 8

5.

E.g., STATEMENT FROM OFFICE OF PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI (July 16, 1999)

(on file with author) (explaining that the President's "pragmatic, consistent, and
innovative" statement carried a "three-fold significance" through: (1) the recognition
that "[the People's Republic of China] has never exercised sovereignty over the Taiwan
area"; (2) the continuity of policy in "promoting constructive dialogue and positive
exchanges"; and (3) the opening of "room for innovations in cross-straits] relations');
STATEMENT FROM KOO CHEN-FU, TAIWAN CROSS-STRAIT NEGOTIATOR (July 30, 1999)
(on file with author) (stating that a characterization of President Lee's remarks on the
"two states theory" constitutes an oversimplification in light of the significance of the
"special state-to-state relationship," which denotes (1) the "unique affection between
the two sides"; (2) the unprecedented and unparalleled intensity of "cross-strait[s]
exchanges in civil, commercial, as well as other sectors"; and (3) the "common will to
pursue a unified China . . . on the basis of parity). For Dr. Lee's political credos, see
LEE TENG-HUI, THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY: TAIWAN'S PURSUIT OF IDENTITY (1999).
6.
For statements supportive of President Lee's posture, see, for example,
Letter to the President, Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina), Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (July 21, 1999) (on file with author)
(remarking that "[b]y having the courage to state the obvious-that the Republic of
China on Taiwan is a de facto sovereign state-the distinguished President Lee has
created an opportunity to break free from the anachronistic, Beijing-inspired [OneChina] policy which has imprisoned U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan for years");
Senators Write Clinton About Taiwan (July 22, 1999), at http://www.taiwandc.org/nws9927.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) (citing Letter to the President, supra, and
articulating that "while [U.S. policy does] not take a stand on the exact nature of
Taiwan's status, [the authors] fully support democratically-elected President Lee and
the people of Taiwan in their search for greater international status'). For critical
positions, see, for example, Press Briefing, James P. Rubin, U.S. Dep't of State (July 13,
1999), at http://secretary.state. gov/www/briefings/9907/990713db.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2001) (observing that "[ilt is not helpful for the Taiwanese authorities to make
statements that would make it harder to have dialogue); Jacoby, supra note 4, at A15
(quoting James Foley of the U.S. Department of State with the remark that U.S. policy
"is unchanged: Our 'One China' policy is longstanding and certainly well known').
7.
James Lilley & Arthur Waldron, Taiwan Is a "State"--Get Over It, WALL
ST. J., July 14, 1999, at A22 (observing that President Lee Teng-hui's state-to-state
comment "follows almost verbatim what German Chancellor [and Nobel Peace Prize
recipient] Willy Brandt said more than 30 years ago when he ended Bonn's long denial
and embraced East Germany as an equal-thus beginning the process that led to
German reunification").
8.
For an overview of Germany's accession to the Council of Europe, the three
European Communities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western
European Union, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
see, for example, MICHAEL SCHWEITZER & WALDEMAR HUMMER, EUROPARECHT 33.37
(1993); STAATSLEXIKON, STICHWORT "EUROPA" (Gdrres Gesellschaft ed., 1986).
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Chancellor Brandt sought concrete steps for approaching the Eastern
neighbors to lower tensions in Central Europe and improve innerGerman relations. 9 Early in his tenure, Mr. Brandt proposed that
the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany conclude a treaty on the mutual relations for the purpose of
"arriving through regulated coexistence at togetherness." 10
Clarifying that his Government did not plan to recognize the German
Democratic Republic under international law," the Chancellor
emphasized that the two states did not constitute foreign countries in
relation to each other.' 2 According to Mr. Brandt, the mutual
relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic were of a specific kind. 13 The offer, which was
made in the context of renouncing the Hallstein doctrine' 4 and
forging the new conception of New East Policy (Neue Ostpolitik),
ultimately resulted in the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic (Vertrag idber die Grundlagender Beziehungen zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik).i5 The Treaty, which is also known as the Basic Treaty
(Grundlagenvertrag),provided the agreement between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to
develop good relations, desist from representing each other or
exerting jurisdiction in the other's territory, and recognize that they
constituted separate entities.' 6 The Basic Treaty was designed to
become the launching pad for a comprehensive treaty policy
enveloping the Federal Republic of Germany and the German

9.

Jochen Abr. Frowein, Current Developments:

The Reunification of

Germany, 86 AM. J. INT L. 152, 162 (1992).

10.

For the original German language version of this quote, see BuliBReg 1969

(132), 1121 ("urn ilber ein geregeltes Nebeneinanderzu einem Afiteinander zu hommen).
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
The Hallstein doctrine treated the recognition of the German Democratic
Republic by a third state as an unfriendJy act toward the Federal Republic of Germany
and, except in the case of the Soviet Union, advocated the severance of all diplomatic
relations with the recognizing state. For a capsule summary of Walter Hallstein's
biography, see HANDLEXIKON DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION 293 (Wolfgang W. Mickel ed.,
1998).

15.
Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic (Basic Treaty), v.14.11.1972 (BGBI. II S. 423)
(F.R.G.), 12 LL.M. 16 (1973), reprinted in U.S. DEPVt OF STATE, DOCEIENTrS O"
GERMANY: 1944-1985, at 1215 (1985); 1 THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERI1A.'Y AND THE
GER-AN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECOND SERIES: FRO.,i
COOPERATION TO UNIFICATION 395 (Ganther Doeker-Mach & Lukas H. Meyer eds..
1991) [hereinafter F.R.G. & G.D.R. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS].

16.
Timothy Kearley, German Division and Reunification, 1944.1990: An
Overview via the Documents, LAW LIBR. J., Winter 1992, at 1. 9.
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Democratic Republic. 17 The Bavarian State Government challenged
the constitutionality of the Basic Treaty under Germany's Basic
Law.' 8 The Federal Constitutional Court, 19 however, held that the

17.
For a comprehensive bibliography, see FUNDSTELLENNACHWEIS B, BEILAGE
ZUM BUNDESGESETZBLATr TEIL II, 1989, ABSCHNITT: VERTRAGE MIT DER DEUTSCHEN
DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIC [BIBLIOGRAPHY B, ADDENDUM TO THE FEDERAL LAW
GAZEITE, PART II, SECTION: TREATIES WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
(1989)].
18.
Grundgesetz [Basic Law] (F.R.G.). For a summary of the history and
features of Germany's Basic Law, see, for example, Kearley, supra note 16, at 5 (noting
that (1) in the summer of 1948, the Western allied military governors asked German
officials in the western zones to convene a constituent assembly; (2) a committee
produced the first draft of the Basic Law in August of that year; (3) a final draft was
approved by the assembly nine months later; and (4) the Basic Law constitutes an
occupation document, designed, according to its preamble, "to give a new order to
political life for a transitional period"); Joseph M. McLaughlin, The Unification of
Germany: What Would Jhering Say?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277, 281 (1994)
(explaining that (1) the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)of West Germany was adopted on May
23, 1949; (2) the term "Constitution" (Verfassung) was avoided at the time because it
was considered to potentially imply a permanent structure excluding East Germany;
and (3) the [fourteen] sections and [almost 150] articles reflect the Basic Law's civil law
tradition and "codify much of the federalist structure and individual rights (developed
by the U.S. Supreme Court] through two centuries of interpretation'); Mathias
Reimann, Takeover: German Reunification Under a Magnifying Glass, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1988, 1995 (1998) (noting that, when the division of Germany became clear in
1949, the Basic Law was drafted as a temporary constitution for the new Federal
Republic of Germany); Bruno Simma, Legal Aspects of East-West German Relations, 9
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 97, 101 (1985) (stating that under this view the Federal
Republic of Germany constituted a "Zweckverband nur administrativer Qualitdt"-a
purpose association of merely administrative quality).
19.
For
discussions
of
the
Federal
Constitutional
Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht),see, for example, DIETER C. UMBACH & THOMAS CLEMENS,
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ:
MITARBEITERKOMMENTAR UND HANDBUCH
699-1408 (1992) (explaining that the Federal Constitutional Court entertains a
multitude of proceedings, which include: (1) forfeiture of basic rights; (2) political party
prohibition; (3) election-and-seat evaluation; (4) impeachment of judges; (5) controversy
among institutions; (6) federation-state controversy; (7) federation-state, state-state,
and state-internal controversies; (8)federal constitutional court as state constitutional
court; (9) abstract norms control; (10) concrete norms control; (11) determination of
international law; (12) continuation of federal law; and (13) individual constitutional
complaint); McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 285-87 (observing that (1) the Federal
Constitutional Court serves as the final interpreter of the Basic Law but that it "takes
a much more active role in the nuts and bolts of daily government than does the U.S.
Supreme Court; (2) like the U.S. Supreme Court, it has the option to declare a measure
null and void (nichtig)or merely incompatible (unvereinbar)with the Basic Law, which,
in the case of a statutory provision, leaves the legislative branch with correcting the
deficiency; (3) the Federal Constitutional Court, which "conducts... an on-going school
of constitutional law" does not exercise general review; and (4) five "Supreme Courtsthe Federal Court of Justice, the Federal Administrative Court, the Federal Social
Court, the Federal Labor Court, and the Federal Finance Court-rule on all factual and
legal other than constitutional questions').
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Basic Treaty was not anti-constitutional. 20 After their admission into
the United Nations 21 the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic exchanged permanent missions. 2 2 The
New East Policy embodied in the Basic Treaty has been credited with
having played a crucial role in the process of inner-German
23
rapprochement that culminated with German reunification.
This Article refreshes the historic German blueprint provided by
the Basic Treaty. It explores the potential significance of the reoriented German d6tente architecture for the relations between
Beijing and Taiwan. 24 Rather than taking sides in one fashion or
another, the Article intends to offer the proposition that
unencumbered creativity in the long term may lead to results that
were previously adjudged as inconceivable. In that sense, the
paradigm associated with the Basic Treaty may assist the parties
concerned with re-energizing the complex legal, political,
philosophical, and psychological cross-strait kaleidoscope.

20.

36 BVerfGE 1 (1973) (F.R.G.). For the English.language translation of the

entire decision, see 1 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 244-69 (1992) [hereinafter

DECISIONS].
21.
GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (1992).

22.
Protocol on the Exchange of Permanent Missions Between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, v.15.3.1974 (BGBI. H S.
933) (F.R.G.), 13 I.L.M. 878 (1974), reprintedin U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 15, at
1265; see also Paul E. Gallis, The Unificationof Germany: Bad:groundand Analysis of
the Two-Plus-Four Talks, in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES
RELATING TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY 17 (1990) (observing that the Federal

Republic did not recognize the German Democratic Republic as a fully sovereign state
based on the absence of free elections).
23.
For voices crediting the efforts of the Brandt Government, see, for example,
Frowein, supranote 9, at 162; Gallis, supranote 22, at 19.
24.
For historical depictions, see, for example, JOSEPH BALLANTiNE, FORMosA:
A PROBLEM FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1952) (outlining, inter alia, the mile

posts of the Chinese Revolution: (1) the fall of the Manchu Dynasty on October 10,
1911, a date that became known as the Double Ten; (2) the foundation of the Republic
of China after the abdication of the last emperor in February 1912; (3) the tenure of Dr.
Sun Yat-sen who started the National People's Party-the Kuomintang-to implement
the Three Principles of the People (San Min Chu 1) of Nationalism. Demecracy.
and People's Livelihood; (4) the takeover of the Kuomintang by General Chiang Kaishek after Dr. Sun's death in 1925; (5) the Japanese invasion in 1937; and (6) the
surrender of Japan in 1945); Chen, supra note 1, at 228-30 (narrating pre-revolution
historical developments shared by the mainland and Taiwan: (1) the investigation of
Taiwan by an exploratory group dispatched by the Sui Emperor Yang-ti in 605 AD; (2)
the migration of Chinese from the coastal provinces of Fujian and Guandong to Taiwan
in the second half of the thirteenth century; (3) the first Japanese establishments in
northern Taiwan and Dutch VOC settlements in southwestern Taiwan in the late
sixteenth century;, and (4) the attack on Taiwan by the Ch'ing and the subsequent
incorporation of Taiwan as a Chinese prefecture and military district of Fujian province
in the late seventeenth century).
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FLASHBACK: THE DtTENTE PARADIGM OFFERED
BY THE BASIC TREATY

A. General Content
On November 8, 1972, the Basic Treaty was initialed and
published, along with several supplementary texts.2 5 The Treaty was
signed on December 21, 1972.26 Several other legal instruments,
including protocols, declarations, and correspondence
were
attached. 21 Prior to the signing, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany had sent a letter on German unity to the
Government of the German Democratic Republic. 28 The legislative
bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany considered, debated, and

25.
36 BVerfGE at 3; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 245-46; see also BulIBReg
1972 (115) 1841, 1853 (providing the Treaty and a number of supplementary texts,
including the indication that the Federal Government would "before signing the Treaty
send a letter to the Government of the German Democratic Republic setting out its
objectives in the national question").
26.
36 BVerfGE at 5; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 247.
27.
36 BVerfGE at 5-6; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 247-48 (listing (1) a
protocol note to the effect that "in view of the differing legal positions on questions of
assets . . . these could not be settled by the Treaty"; (2) two recorded declarations
stating for the Federal Republic of Germany that "[niationality questions have not been
regulated by the Treaty" and for the German Democratic Republic "[t]he German
Democratic Republic takes it as a basis that the Treaty will facilitate regulation of
nationality questions"; (3) two recorded declarations by the Contracting Parties on
application for membership in the United Nations; (4) a recorded declaration of both
heads of the delegation on the tasks of the Boundary Commission; (5) a recorded
declaration by the head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on
administrative relations; (6) a declaration by both parties on the extension of
agreements and settlements to West Berlin; (7) a declaration by both parties on
"political consultation"; (8) recorded declarations in connection with the exchange of
letters on possibilities of work for journalists; (9) a declaration by both parties on the
extension of the agreement on possibilities of work for journalists to West Berlin; (10)
an exchange of letters of December 21, 1972, on the reuniting of families, the
facilitation of travel, and improvements in the non-commercial movement of goods; (11)
an exchange of letters of December 21, 1972, on the opening of four more bordercrossing points; (12) an exchange of letters of December 21, 1972, containing the tenor
of the notes of the Federal Republic of Germany to the three Western powers and of the
German Democratic Republic to the Soviet Union on Article 9 of the Treaty; (13) an
exchange of letters on postal and telecommunication services; (14) an exchange of
letters on the application by both states for membership in the United Nations; and
(15) an exchange of letters on the possibilities of work for journalists).
28.
36 BVerfGE at 6; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 248.
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adopted the ratification law for the Basic Treaty. 29

On June 21,

1973, the Treaty entered into force. 30
The Basic Treaty consisted of ten articles. 31 It committed the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
to "develop normal neighborly relations with each other on the basis
of equality of rights."32 Moreover, the sovereign equality of all states,
respect for independence, autonomy, and territorial integrity, the
right of self-determination, the preservation of human rights, and the
principle of non-discrimination were espoused. 33 The Treaty affirmed
the inviolability of the existing borders.3 4 Furthermore, the two
states were held unable to represent the other internationally or act
in the other's name. 35 In addition, the Basic Treaty pledged the
promotion of peaceful relations and disarmament. 36 The Treaty

29.
Act of June 6, 1973, on the Treaty of December 21, 1972, Between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the Basis of
Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic (providing in its Article 1 that "It]he [Basic] Treaty . . . including [the
following listed legal instruments] ... is assented to").
30.
36 BVerfGE at 7; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 249 (explaining that,
according to the promulgation in the Federal Gazette of June 22, 1973, the Treaty
entered into force on June 21, 1973, "following the exchange of corresponding notes
between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of
the German Democratic Republic, which took place on 20 June 1973 in Bonn").
31.
36 BVerfGE at 3-5; DECISIONS, supranote 20, at 246-47.
32.
Article 1 provides: "The Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic will develop normal neighbourly relationships with each other on
the basis of equality of rights." Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (Basic Treaty),
v.14.11.1972 (BGBI. H S. 423) (F.R.G.), reprintedin DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 246.
33.
Article 2 provides:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will
be guided by the aims and principles embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations, in particular the sovereign equality of all States. respect for
independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right of selfdetermination, the upholding of human rights and non-discrimination.
Id.
34.

Article 3 provides:

In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will resolve their disputes
exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force.
They reaffirm the inviolability of the frontier existing between them now and
in the future and commit themselves to unrestricted respect for their territorial

integrity.
Id.
35.
Article 4 provides: "The Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic take the position that neither of the two States can represent the
other internationally or act in its name." Id.
36.
Article 5 provides:
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further stated that the sovereign power of each state was confined to
its state territory and that each party was to respect the other's
independence and autonomy in internal and external affairs. 37 The
normalization process was directed at resolving practical and
humanitarian questions as well as cooperating in a broad suite of
areas.3 8 The Basic Treaty also announced the exchange of permanent
representations.3 9 It clarified that existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements remained unaffected. 40 Finally, the
Treaty imposed a ratification requirement and regulated the
41
modalities of its entry into force.

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will
promote peaceful relations among European States and contribute to security

and co-operation in Europe. They support efforts towards reduction of forces
and armaments in Europe, without disadvantages for the security of the parties
being allowed thereby to arise.
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will,
with the object of general and complete disarmament under effective
international control, support efforts serving international security at limiting
armaments and at disarmament, in particular in the area of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction.
Id.
37.
Article 6 provides: 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic base themselves on the principle that the sovereign power of each
of the two States is confined to its State territory. They respect the independence and
autonomy of each of the two States in internal and external affairs." Id. at 246-47.
38.
Article 7 provides:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
declare their readiness, in the course of normalization of their relationships, to
regulate practical and humanitarian questions.
They will conclude
agreements, in order on the basis of this Treaty and for their mutual advantage
to develop and promote co-operation in the area of the economy, science and
technology, transport, legal relations, posts and telecommunications, health,
culture, sport, environmental protection and other areas. Details are regulated
in the Additional Protocol.
Id. at 247.
39.
Article 8 provides: 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic will exchange permanent representations. They will be set up at
the seats of the respective governments. Practical questions connected with the setting
up of the representations will be regulated subsidiarily." Id.
40.
Article 9 provides: 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic agree that through this Treaty bilateral and multi-lateral
international treaties and agreements formerly concluded by them or affecting them
are unaffected." Id.
41.
Article 10 provides: 'This Treaty shall require ratification and shall enter
into force on the day following exchange of corresponding notes .... " Id.
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B. Legal Challenge Before the Federal ConstitutionalCourt

1. The Petitions
The Bavarian State Government petitioned the Federal
Constitutional Court to declare the ratification law null and void for
being incompatible with the Basic Law.4 2 The petitioner reasoned
that the Treaty contravened the constitutional precept of maintaining
Germany's national unity and infringed the constitutional duty of

care and protection 3vis-a-vis Germans residing in the German
4

Democratic Republic.
The Federal Government requested a finding that the
ratification law was compatible with the Basic Law. 44 It alleged that
the petitioner, under the guise of advancing legal principles, read its
45
purely political concepts into the Basic Law.

2. The Holding
The Court unanimously rejected the petition. 46 It held that the
4
abstract norms-control proceeding was admissible but unfounded. 7
a. Admissibility

48

The Court affirmed the admissibility of the petition.4 9 The Court
read the Basic Law's requirement of parliamentary control in the
form of a ratification law for all treaties with foreign countries
regulating the political relations of the Federation or relating to
matters of Federal legislation5 0 to include treaties with the German

42.
For the legal requirements governing this abstract-norms control
proceeding, see Article 93, No. 2, of the Basic Law in conjunction with §§13, No. 6. 76 et
seq. of the Federal Constitutional Court Act; UMBACH & CLEMENS, supra note 19, at
972-1011. For an English-language version of the petition, see, for example, U.S. DEPVT
OF STATE, supranote 15, at 1248; F.R.G. & G.D.R. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra
note 15, at 405.
36 BVerfGE 1, 7-10 (1973) (F.R.G.); DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 249-51
43.
(further alleging that the Treaty violated the constitutional provisions with respect to
Berlin).
36 BVerfGE at 10-12; DECISIONS, supranote 20, at 251-52.
44.
36 BVerfGE at 10-12; DECISIONS, supranote 20, at 251-52.
45.
36 BVerfGE at 13-37; DECISIONS, supranote 20, at 253-69.
46.
36 BVerfGE at 13-37; DECISIONS, supranote 20, at 253-69.
47.
48.
Under admissibility (Zuldssigkeit) the jurisdictional issues posed by the
petition are addressed.
36 BVerfGE at 13; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 253.
49.
Article 59 of the Basic Law (1973) [Representation at international law]
50.
provides:
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Democratic Republic. 5 1 The Court therefore distilled the ratification
law and the Basic Treaty, including the Additional Protocol, as the
52
appropriate subjects of its review.
The Court identified the Basic Law as the measuring standard
and added several considerations for exercising its prerogative of
giving binding interpretations of the Basic Law. 53 It explained that
mere treaty law was not able to alter the existing constitutional
order. 54
The Court emphasized that among several possible
interpretations of a treaty only those complying with the Basic Law
were allowed. 55 It added that adherence to judicial self-restraint
meant that the Court would not "play politics" or intrude into the
space created and delimited by the Basic Law for free policy-making
by the other constitutional bodies. 56 The Court concluded that in
light of the Basic Law's decision for comprehensive constitutional
review, the executive should not seek to out-maneuver pending
proceedings, and therefore a treaty should not enter into force before
57
an abstract norms-control judgment was handed down.

(1) The Federal President represents the Federation at international law. He

concludes treaties with foreign countries in the name of the Federation. He
accredits and receives delegates.
(2) Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to
matters of Federal legislative jurisdiction shall require the consent or
participation, in the form of a Federal law, of the bodies respectively competent
for such Federal legislation. For administrative agreements, the provision
concerning the Federal administration shall apply correspondingly.
51.
36 BVerfGE at 13; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 253.
52.
Id. (noting that the review also included protocols and that other notes,
reservations, declarations, and letters served as important interpretational sources in
this context); see also GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIC DEUTSCHLAND 300-01
n.11 (Karl-Heinz Seifert et al. eds., 1988) (emphasizing that, since ratification laws
rank below the Basic Law, they may be the proper subject of abstract-norms control
proceedings).
53.
36 BVerfGE at 13-14; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 253-54.
54.
36 BVerfGE at 13-14; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 253-54.
55.
36 BVerfGE at 13-14; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 253-54.
56.
36 BVerfGE at 14; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 254.
57.
36 BVerfGE at 15; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 254 (admonishing that,
should a situation exceptionally arise-as in the present case-where the executive
deems the earlier entry into force of a treaty indispensable, then the constitutional
organ responsible must answer for any consequences that may arise therefrom).
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58
b. Substance

The Court determined that the Basic Treaty was compatible
with the Basic Law. 59 The Court prefaced the details of the Treaty's
constitutional assessment with an analysis of the legal status of
Germany and a description of the relevant legal frameworks.6 0
The Court explained that, pursuant to the Basic Law, the
Federal Republic of Germany was "partially identical" with the
61
German Reich that continued to exist despite its incapability to act.

Under substance (Begrhndetheit)the merits of the petition are addressed.
58.
36 BVerfGE at 15-37; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 255-69.
59.
36 BVerfGE at 15-20; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 255-58.
60.
36 BVerfGE at 15-16; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 255 (citing the Preamble
61.
and Articles 16, 23, 116, and 146 of the Basic Law in support of the proposition that the
German Reich had not perished as a result of its capitulation or the exercise of foreign
sovereignty by the Allied Occupation Powers). The Preamble of the Basic Law
provides:
In awareness of their responsibility before God and Men, animated by the
will to preserve its national and state identity and to serve world peace as an
equal member in a united Europe, the German People, in the Liinder of Baden,
Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine.Westphalia,
and
WOirtemberg-Baden,
Schleswig-Holstein,
Rhineland-Palatinate,
Wiirtemberg-Hohenzollern, in order to give state life for a transitional time a
new order, have, by virtue of their constituent power, adopted this Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany.
They have also acted on behalf of those Germans that were denied from
participating. The entire German People remain asked to accomplish in free
self-determination Germany's unity and freedom.
Article 16 of the Basic Law [Deprivation of citizenship, extradition, right of asylum)
provides:
(1) The German citizenship must not be revoked. The loss of citizenship may
arise only pursuant to statutory law, and, against the will of the person
affected, it may arise only if the person concerned does not thereby become
stateless.
(2) No German must be extradited to a foreign country. Persons persecuted for
political reasons enjoy the right of asylum.
Article 23 of the Basic Law [Scope of applicability of the Basic Law] provides: "This
Basic Law applies at first in the territory of the LAnder of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen,
Great-Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North.Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland.
Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wfirtemberg-Baden, and Wfirtembeg-Hohenzollern. In
other parts of Germany, it shall be entered into force after their accession."
Article 116 of the Basic Law (1973) [Definition of the term "a German." renaturalization] provides:
(1) Subject to the reservation of regulation by statute otherwise, a German
within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German
citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich
within the frontiers as of December 31, 1937, as a refugee or expellee of
German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such a person.
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In this sense, the sovereign power of the Federal Republic of
Germany, as a newly organized part of Germany, was confined to the
area covered by the Basic Law. 62 The Court added that, because the
German Democratic Republic was also part of Germany, it did not
constitute a foreign country in relation to the Federal Republic of
Germany. 63 The Court identified reunification in the exercise of selfdetermination as a constitutional command. 64
Within this
constitutional parameter, the Court continued, the Federal
Government enjoyed a margin of evaluation and discretion with
respect to the political ways and means to achieve the reunification
goal. 65 The Court, however, admonished that the Basic Law barred
the Federal Republic of Germany and its constitutional organs from
relinquishing the constitutionally mandated legal title (Rechtstitel) to
the realization of German unity and self-determination. 66 Similarly,
creating a title incompatible with the Basic Law or becoming involved
with the establishment of an anti-constitutional position were
disallowed. 67 According to the Court, all constitutional organs were
obliged to maintain the claim to reunification alive domestically and
defend it with vigor externally. Any political conduct that forfeited
the reunification goal was constitutionally outlawed. 68 The Court

(2) Former German citizens who, between January 30, 1933, and May 8, 1945,
were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial or religious grounds, and
their descendants, are re-naturalized on application. They are considered as
not having been deprived of their German citizenship if they have established
their residence in Germany after May 8, 1945, and have not expressed a
contrary will.
Article 146 of the Basic Law [Duration of validity of the Basic Law] provides: '"This
Constitution loses its validity on the day when a constitution that has been freely
decided in free determination by the German people enters into force."
62.
36 BVerfGE at 17; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 255 (explaining that the
Federal Republic of Germany consisted of the Ldinder mentioned in Article 23 of the
Basic Law, including Berlin, albeit subject to the so-called reservation of the Governors
of the Western Powers).
63.
36 BVerfGE at 17; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 256 (clarifying that inter.
zonal and German internal trade were not foreign trade).
64.
36 BVerfGE at 17; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 256 (emphasizing that the
Preamble to the Basic Law had legal content).
65.
36 BVerfGE at 18; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 256 (stating that the
policy-making bodies, as opposed to the Court, are responsible for making political
choices).
66.
36 BVerfGE at 18-19; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 256-57.
67.
36 BVerfGE at 18-19; DECISIONS, supranote 20, at 256-57.
68.
36 BVerfGE at 18-19; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 256-57 (allowing
political abstinence from using a legal title as long as forfeiture was avoided, as well as
the new expression "German nation" if it were to be synonymous with "German body
politic;" however, barring the characterization of the Four-Power responsibility for
Germany as a whole as the (last) peg for the continued existence of Germany as a
whole).
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noted that it was not called upon in this case to decide whether a sole
claim to represent Germany as a whole (Alleinuetretungsanspruchfar
Deutschland als Ganzes) potentially held by the Federal Republic of
Germany was rooted in the Basic Law.6 9

In summary, the Court

70
found that the Treaty had not left the constitutional bedrock.
The Court then discussed the Basic Treaty within its broader
contexts. 71 According to the Court, the Treaty was part of the
Federal Government's comprehensive East Policy directed at d6tente
and expressed in the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw. 72 The Basic
Treaty, which did not contain a time limitation nor a denunciation
clause, constituted a fundamental reorientation of the relations
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic and provided the basis for future legal
specifications with respect to shaping the new coexistence and
togetherness of the two states. 73 The Court observed that the Basic
Treaty was embedded in more comprehensive and specific legal
frameworks. 74 This, according to the Court, was evidenced by the
Treaty's reference to the United Nations and its clause leaving intact
the bilateral and multilateral international treaties and agreements
that were concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic as well as those affecting the two
states. 75 The Court stated that, even in the absence of a formal
recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal
Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic was a state
and subject of international law. 76 In light of the consistent previous
practice of explicitly denying a formal recognition to the German
Democratic Republic, the Court characterized the Federal Republic of
Germany's new policy of detente, especially the conclusion of the
Basic Treaty, as a factual recognition of a specific kind (besonderer

69.
36 BVerfGE at 19-20; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 257-58 (noting that the
Court had never made a pronouncement with respect to such a sole claim).
70.
36 BVerfGE at 20; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 258 (concluding that the
Treaty was interpretable in a manner that did not conflict with the constitutional
requirements of the Basic Law).
71.
36 BVerfGE at 20-24; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 258.61.
72.
36 BVerfGE at 20; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 258.
73.
36 BVerfGE at 21; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 258-59 (noting that future
concretizations through subsequent agreements and accords were subject to
constitutional limits).
74.
36 BVerfGE at 21-22; DECISIONS, supranote 20. at 259 (invoking Articles 2,
3, and 9 of the Treaty).
75.
36 BVerfGE at 21-22; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 259 (listing, inter alia,
the Western Treaties, the German Treaty, and the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties).
76.
36 BVerfGE at 22; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 259 (highlighting the
significance attached to the formulas used in the political debate: "existing special
relationships between the two states" and "the Treaty has a special nature
corresponding with these special circumstances).
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Art). 7

The Court found that the Treaty had a dual character
because, by its type, it exhibited an international law nature78 and,
by its content, it regulated "inter se relations" (inter-seBeziehungen)79-a formula used for describing the special legal
closeness between the two parties.8 0 The Court concluded that not
every "two-state model" (Zwei-Staaten-Modell) for Germany was anticonstitutional.8 1
The Court finally assessed the details of the Basic Treaty.8 2 The
Court found that the Preamble to the Treaty8 3 and the letter on
German unity8 4 evidenced that the Federal Government did not

relinquish the legal title and ability to promote the national unity of
the German people through free self-determination and peaceful
means in consonance with the general principles of international
law.8 5 The Court characterized the border between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic as a
border in national law8 6 based on the continued existence of Germany
as a whole.8 7 The border confirmation, the Court added, amounted to
a new and additional recognition by treaty that was compatible with

77.
36 BVerfGE at 23; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 259-60.
78.
36 BVerfGE at 24; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 260 (explaining that the
Treaty was governed by international law; however, it involved two states that are part
of a still-existing-albeit incapable of acting for lack of reorganization-state of the
whole of Germany with a single body politic).
79.
36 BVerfGE at 23; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 260 (reasoning that (1)
permanent representations, as opposed to ambassadors, were envisioned; (2)
"corresponding notes" rather than instruments of ratification were exchanged; and (3)

both parties did not consider trade as foreign trade).
80.
36 BVerfGE at 23; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 260.
81.
36 BVerfGE at 24; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 261.
82.
36 BVerfGE at 24-35; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 261-68.
83.
36 BVerfGE at 25-26; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 261-62 (interpreting the
phrase "national question" as the Basic Law's position in maintaining the national
unity of the German people).
84.
36 BVerfGE at 25; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 261 (emphasizing that the
letter's content was announced before the conclusion of the negotiations and delivered
to the other party prior to signature of the Treaty).
85.
36 BVerfGE at 25-26; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 261-62.
86.
36 BVerfGE at 26; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 262 (distinguishing
between administrative borders, borders of demarcation, borders of spheres of interest,
borders of the area within the scope of application of the Basic Law, borders of the
German Reich as of December 31, 1937, national borders, and borders that enclose a
whole state and those inside a composite state).
87.
36 BVerfGE at 26; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 262 (reasoning that this
assessment was compatible with (1) the agreement between the parties to promote
normal neighborly relations, embrace sovereign equality, and confine sovereign power
to the respective state theory; and (2) the Basic Law's claim to keep the national
question open).
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the Basic Law.88 The agreement between the parties of confining the
exercise of their sovereign power to their respective territories was
subject to the interpretation stipulating the continued existence of

Germany as a whole.8 9 The Court emphasized that the Basic Law
prohibited the Federal Government from entering into a dependency,
by treaty, that rendered incorporation of other parts of Germany
subject to a prior agreement with its treaty partners. 9 0 In this sense,
the Court explained, the Federal Republic of Germany was
constitutionally bound to retain its role as the sole master of any
future decisions with respect to other parts of Germany that were
willing and able to accede to the Basic Law. 91 The Court summarized
that the inclusion of other parts of Germany into one free German
state had to remain legally possible after the entry into force of the
92
Basic Treaty.
The Court found the Treaty compatible with the constitutional
citizenship provisions. 93 The broad notion of German citizenship,
according to the Court, simultaneously applied to the citizens of the
Federal Republic of Germany as well as to those Germans not

currently residing in the Federal Republic of Germany.9 4 The Court
explained that all Germans, including the citizens of the German

Democratic Republic, within the ambit of the Basic Law, were

88.
36 BVerfGE at 27; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 263 (noting that the
Treaty's stipulation with respect to the existence and course of the border did not stand
in the way of a future change by mutual agreement pursuant to the rules of
international law).
89.
36 BVerfGE at 27-28; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 263 (invoking the
special situation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic as sub-states of Germany as a whole that was incapable of action for want of
organization).
90.
36 BVerfGE at 28-29; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 263-64 (es-plaining that,
as a consequence of Article 23 of the Basic Law, the Federal Republic of Germany
regarded itself as territorially incomplete and legally open to its desired growth in
conjunction with the restoration of German unity).
91.
36 BVerfGE at 29; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 264 (adding that the precondition for bringing about accession is a constitutional process inside the German
Democratic Republic and outside the legal influence of the Federal Republic of
Germany).
92.
36 BVerfGE at 29; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 264 (admonishing that this
legal view established by the Basic Law was to be asserted against the German
Democratic Republic's political conception of confining German unification to the rise of
a future communist state).
93.
36 BVerfGE at 29-31; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 264-65 (referring to
Articles 16 and 116 (1) of the Basic Law).
94.
36 BVerfGE at 30; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 264-65 (emphasizing that
the Basic Treaty did not convert the German Democratic Republic into a foreign
country in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany and that the Basic Treaty
barred the Federal Republic of Germany from recognizing a revocation of German
citizenship by another state).
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entitled to all guarantees of the fundamental rights 95 and the full
protection by the courts as well as other avenues, such as the Federal
Republic of Germany's diplomatic representations and membership
96
in international organizations.
The Court scrutinized the various areas of cooperation
contemplated by the Basic Treaty for future agreements against the
measuring standards of the Basic Law. 97 The Court emphasized
that, in the areas of postal and telecommunications, the Federal
Government was disallowed from handing away the guarantee of the
secrecy of letters, postal, and telecommunications, 98 as well as from
99
restricting the freedom to exchange opinions and information.
Moreover, according to the Court, trade between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic was barred from
becoming foreign trade through the erection of customs borders of

95.
36 BVerfGE at 31; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 265 (admonishing that any
curtailment of the rights accorded by the Basic Law, including the asset questions
referenced in the protocol note, through the Basic Treaty proper or its implementation
vehicles was anti-constitutional).
96.
36 BVerfGE at 31-32; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 266 (noting that the
Federal Government was empowered to raise its voice, assert its influence, and act for
the interests of the German nation as well as to provide assistance whenever a German
approached an office of the Federal Republic of Germany).
97.
36 BVerfGE at 33-35; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 267-68 (referring to the
additional protocol on Article 7 of the Basic Treaty).
98.
36 BVerfGE at 33; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 267 (invoking Article 10 of
the Basic Law). Article 10 of the Basic Law (1973) [Privacy of letters as well as postal
and telecommunications] provides:
(1) The privacy of letters as well as the privacy of postal and telecommunication
are inviolable.
(2) Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to statutory law. If a restriction
serves the protection of the free democratic basic order or the patrimony or
security of the Federation or a State, the statutory law may stipulate that the
person concerned shall not be informed and that the recourse to the courts shall
be replaced by the review through the bodies and auxiliary bodies appointed by
Parliament.
99.
36 BVerfGE at 33; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 267 (referencing Article 5
of the Basic Law). Article 5 of the Basic Law [Freedom of opinion] provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in
word, writing, and image, and to freely inform himself from generally accessible
sources without hindrance. The freedom of the press and the freedom of
reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There will be no
censorship.
(2) These rights are subject to the limitations in the provisions of the general
statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of the youth, and in the right
to personal honor.
(3) Art and science, research and academia are free. The freedom of teaching
does not release one from the allegiance to the constitution.
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any type. 10 0 The Court further held that the Treaty was unable to
alter the independence of developing television and broadcasting
programs' 0 ' or to restrict the freedom of association.10 2 The Court
added that the Treaty did not dispense the federal and state
institutions from their constitutional duty to keep the public
consciousness alive with respect to the common features as well as
the ideological, political, and social distinctions between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 10 3 The
Court clarified that the practices at the border between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic,
including the wall, barbed wire, free-fire zones, and the order to
shoot, were incompatible with the Treaty. 10 4 In sum, the Court held
that the Basic Treaty, in the interpretation advanced in the decision,
did not contradict the Basic Law. l0 5
c. Observations
The Basic Treaty decision ranks among the classics in the
history of the Federal Constitutional Court. It reflects the Court's
unique methodology and cautious, yet determined, adjudication of
politically charged controversies.
The Court interpreted the Basic Treaty in such a way that it was
not found violative of the Basic Law's requirement for the German

100.
36 BVerfGE at 33; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 267.
101.
36 BVerfGE at 33-34; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 267 (explaining that the
fundamental right under Article 5 of the Basic Law trumped any potential assertion by
the German Democratic Republic that certain broadcasts contradicted the content and
spirit of the Treaty as an intervention in its internal affairs).
102.
36 BVerfGE at 34; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 267-68 (reasoning that the
formation of associations in accordance with the Basic Law was not amenable to any
restriction even if the German Democratic Republic found their goals and propaganda
incompatible with the content and spirit of the Treaty). Article 9 of the Basic Law
[Freedom of association and coalition] provides that: "(1) All Germans have the right to
form associations and societies; (2) Associations whose purposes or activities conflict
with the criminal statutes or direct themselves against the constitutional order or the
concept of international understanding, Pre prohibited."
103.
36 BVerfGE at 34; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 268 (stating that any
attempt to limit the freedom of the Federal Government in this sphere was contrary to
the Treaty).
104.
36 BVerfGE at 35; DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 268 (qualifying the Treaty
as an additional basis for the Federal Republic of Germany to bring about the abolition
of these inhuman conditions).
105.
36 BVerfGE at 35-37; DECISIONS, supra note 20. at 268-69 (clarifying the
significance of the grounds of the decision for the appropriate interpretation of the
Treaty in full compliance with the Basic Law, which is predicated upon (1) the dissent
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the
"national question"; (2) the rise of follow-up treaties; and (3) the German Democratic
Republic's full cognizance of the Federal Republic of Germany's constitutional
requirements).
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people to work for unity. 10 6 The Court saved the Basic Treaty
through a technique that is known as "interpretation in conformance
°
with the constitution" (verfassungskonforme Auslegung)." "
Deciding that under the Basic Treaty Germany could still be
conceived as one nation, that had been reorganized temporarily into two
entities, the Court advanced the position that the German state
represented by the Reich never ceased to exist.' 0 8 This was the premise
of the four principal continuation theories (Fortbestandstheorien),which
held that the German state did not perish with the surrender in 1945109
or at any time later."l 0 The state-nucleus theory (Staatskerntheorie)
asserted the identity of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Reich, however, distinguished between the state territory and
the scope of application of the Basic Law."' The shrink-state theory
(Schrumpfstaatstheorie)posited that the state territory of the German
Reich was reduced to the state territory of the Federal Republic of

106.
Kearley, supra note 16, at 9 (emphasizing the Constitutional Court's
finding that under the Basic Treaty, Germany could still be conceived of as being one
nation that had been reorganized temporarily as two entities because, among other
things, the Preamble included the phrase "without prejudice to the differing views of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on questions of
principle, including the national question').
107.
UMBACH & CLEMENS, supra note 19, at 1004 (explaining that (1) the
technique is applied when the wording and purpose of the tested legal provisions allow
several readings; (2) the Federal Constitutional Court in its role as "negative legislator"
is barred from intruding into the sphere of the legislator through imposition of a
specific interpretation; (3) the technique employed by the Court reflects the unity of the
legal order, the presumption of constitutional conduct for the legislative branch, and
the respect for the tasks bestowed upon the democratically legitimated legislator; (4)
this type of interpretation does not exhibit clear contours; (5) the route is foreclosed if
the text under scrutiny is clear and unambiguous; and (6) the interpretation must not
change or basically re-determine the contents and purpose of the tested legal
provision).
108.
MICHAEL SCHWEITZER, STAATSRECHT III: STAATSRECHT, VbLKERRECHT,
EUROPARECHT 195-96 n.481 (1995).
109.
For the surrenders signed at Rheims and at Berlin, see Terms Between the
United States of America and the Other Allied Powers and Germany, Signed at Rheims
May 7, 1945 and at Berlin May 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1857 (1945).
110.
DIETER BLUMENWITZ, WHAT Is GERMANY? EXPLORING GERMANY'S STATUS
AFTER WORLD WAR II 30 (1989) (diagnosing that the sovereignty of the occupation
forces lay over Germany like a blanket but did not interrupt the continuity of German
statehood); GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES IN
GERMANY 1, 2 (1987) (emphasizing that "Germany continue[s] to exist, although under
the responsibility of the four powers" and that "the legal status of Germany as a whole
has never been altered and exists up to the present time); Gallis, supra note 22, at 7,
17 (observing that despite the requirement of unconditional surrender, the division of
Germany into four sectors, and the imposition of an occupation regime by the Allies,
"both the Federal Republic and the Western Allies continue to hold the view that the
whole German state was neither annexed nor abolished at Yalta or Potsdam, or by any
succeeding conventions or agreements").
111.
SCHWEITZER, supra note 108, at 195 n.478.
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Germany.l l2 The roof theory (Dachtheorie)diagnosed that the German
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany were two
legal entities existing under the one roof of the invisible, but extant,
German Reich. n 3 The partial-identity theory (Teilidentitctstheorie)
contended that the Federal Republic of Germany was (at least partially)
identical with the Reich and exerted German state power as the allies
relinquished it,114 even though the Federal Republic of Germany did not
control all of the territory formerly belonging to the Reich. 11 5 In
contrast to the continuation teachings, the two main termination
theories (Untergangstheorien)held that the German Reich perished as a
subject of international law due to the unconditional capitulation or
certain subsequent events. 116
The total-conquest theory
(Debellationstheorie)provided that the surrender of the German Reich
and the takeover of the government by the allied powers extinguished

112.
Id. (using the term interchangeably with core state theory,
Kernstaatstheorie).
113.
Georg Ress, Germany, Legal Status After World War H, in 10
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 191, 197-98 (1987) (explaining that the

occupation powers were fiduciaries in the exercise of government power on behalf of the
German Reich which continued to exist as a state albeit incapable of acting).
114. For documentation in support of the progressive sovereignty gains of the
Federal Republic of Germany, see Kearley, supra note 16, at 4-8 (listing for the time
interval between 1949 and 1955 the following main documents: (1) Agreements
Between the United States of America, France, and the United Kingdom Respecting
Basic Principles for Merger of the Three Western German Zones of Occupation, Apr. 8,
1949, 63 Stat. 2817, 140 U.N.T.S. 196, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 15,
at 215; (2) Occupation Statute Defining the Powers to be Retained by the Occupation
Authorities, Apr. 8, 1949, reprinted in U.S. DEPVT OF STATE, supra note 15, at 212; 1
F.R.G. & G.D.R. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 15, at 85; (3) Letter from the
Military Governors of the Three Western Zones of Occupation to the President of the
West German Parliamentary Council Approving, with Reservations, the Basic Law for
the Federal Republic of Germany, May 12, 1949, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
supra note 15, at 260; 1 F.R.G. & G.D.R. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 15,
at 75; (4) Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4251, amended by Schedule I of the Protocol on the
Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 25,
1954, 331 U.N.T.S. 327; reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 15, at 425; 1
F.R.G. & G.D.R. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 15, at 111; (5) Protocol on
Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23,
1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 253, reprintedin U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 15,
at 434; 2 F.R.G. & G.D.R. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 15. at 32; and (6)
Proclamation by the Allied High Commission Revoking the Occupation Statute and
Abolishing the Allied High Commission and the Offices of the Land Commissioners in
the Federal Republic of Germany, May 5, 1955, reprintedin U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra
note 15, at 444).
115.
SCHWEITZER, supra note 108, at 195 n.478.
116. Id. at 195 n.477 (providing that the proponents of this theory offer various
events with respect to the alleged collapse of the German Reich: (1) the establishment
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1949; (2)
the recognition of full sovereignty by the respective occupation powers in 1954; and (3)
the entry into force of the Basic Treaty in 1973).
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the element of state power and replaced it with a "condominium."'117
The dismemberment theory (Dismembrationsthorie)stipulated that the
German Reich split into two new parts that were not her legal
successors.118
The legal positions of the German Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany changed several times. The German
Democratic Republic initially asserted its full identity with Germany
as a whole and denied the existence of two German states. 119 After a
short flirt with the roof theory, the German Democratic Republic
switched to the total-conquest theory arguing that, in the wake of the
extinction of the German Reich, two independent successor states
had emerged. 120 The Federal Republic of Germany viewed itself as
the only legitimate successor to German state power formerly exerted
by the Reich. 121 The associated claim to sole representation of
Germany as a whole in the international arena, however, failed vis-hvis the Western Powers and the other countries at large. 122 The New
23
East Policy exhibited aspects of the shrink state and roof theories.'
The Federal Constitutional Court tilted toward the partial-identity
theory. 124
The Federal Republic of Germany most ostensibly
expressed its assertion of responsibility for Germany as a whole in
the area of nationality and citizenship. 125 The case law of the

117.
See generally Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the
Declaration of Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 518 (1945). For a definition of condominium,
see VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 67 ("[a] territory jointly governed by two or more
states").
118.
SCHWEITZER, supranote 108, at 194 n.477.
119.
Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, art. 1, reprinted in U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 15, at 278 (claiming that Germany is an "indivisible
democratic republic" and that there is "only one German nationality').
120.
JENS HACKER, DER RECHTSSTATUS DEUTSCHLANDS AUS DER SICHT DER DDR
137, 154 (1974); see also Kearley, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that, as the policy of the
German Democratic Republic changed in this regard, so did the relevant wording of
later constitutions).
121.
1 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 326 (1963);
Frowein, supra note 9, at 157 n.30 (explaining that (1) the Federal Republic of
Germany had always considered itself to be the continuation of the German state
founded in 1867-1871; (2) in 1867, the North German Federation, NorddeutscherBund,
was established under the political leadership of Prussia; and (3) pursuant to the
generally accepted view, the southern German states acceded to this federation in
1871).
122.
SCHWEITZER, supranote 108, at 195 n.480.
123.
Id.
124.
For another leading case, see the Teso Decision, Judgment of Oct. 21, 1987,
77 BVerfGE 134 (1987) (providing that the state Federal Republic of Germany
exhibited "subject identity" with the "subject of international law German Reich').
125.
Frowein, supra note 9, at 161-62 (explaining that (1) in the minds of the
German people the existence of a common German nationality was the most important
bond with Germany as a whole; (2) pursuant to Article 116 of the Basic Law persons

20011

DAtTENTE ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Federal Constitutional Court basically confu'med the broad approach
12 6
to German nationality.
International law suggested that the German Reich had not
perished. 127 At the same time, however, the dismemberment of the
German Reich and subsequent rise of two new states1 28 or, in the
alternative, the secession of the German Democratic Republic and
corresponding shrinking of the German Reich to the territory of the
Federal Republic of Germany 129 remained plausible constructions.
The assessment problems associated with evidencing the processes
underlying a status determination for Germany was for practical
purposes resolved on the basis of divided-state or two-states
models.' 3 0
This pragmatic approach constituted the basis for

who held German nationality in 1949 are German in the constitutional sense; (3) the
Federal Republic of Germany included in the ambit of the provision all those who had
acquired German nationality in accordance with legislation; (4) for those who also held
German Democratic Republic nationality, German nationality provided an "open door";
(5) all citizens of the German Democratic Republic were entitled to place themselves
under the protection of the Federal Republic; (6) the Federal Republic of Germany
convinced many states of the practice of letting the individual decide which of the two
German nationalities he or she wanted to invoke; and (7) the justification for that
practice arose from the special status of Germany and the persistent bar to the free
exercise of self-determination endured by the German people).
126.
77 BverfGE at 137 (finding that persons naturalized in the German
Democratic Republic acquired German nationality).
127.
SCHVEITZER, supra note 108, at 196 n.483 (reasoning that the four allied
powers asserted rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole).
128.
Id.
129.
E.g., Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemner, The Enduring
Political Nature of Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for
Objective Standards, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 753, 803 (1996) (offering that valid
instances of secession should contain the following three elements: "(1) the territory in
question must have the traditional characteristics of a state; (2) the prospective state
must be willing to follow the principles laid out in the U.N. Charter;, and, (3) the
international community should demand that the prospective new state obtain the
consent and follow the applicable laws of its current sovereign (the 'prospective
predecessory'; Salvatore Massa, Secession by Mutual Assent: A Comparative Analysis
of the Dissolutionof Czechoslovakia and the Separatist Movement in Canada, 14 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 183, 218 (1995) (presenting arguments advanced in support of a right to
secession: "(1) the 'liberal democratic theory,' (2) human rights. (3) a 'calculation of
legitimacy,' and (4) a territorially based test that evaluates the nature and extent of a
historical grievance and whether such grievance has been kept alive"). For case
evaluations, see, for example, SCHVEITZER, supra note 108, at 196 n.483 (qualifying, in
light of reunification, the temporary existence of the German Democratic Republic as a
failed attempt at succession); Andreas J. Jacovides, Cyprus-The International Law
Dimension, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoLY 1221 (1995) (condemning the "attempted
secession").
130.
For a discussion of the divided state, see, for example, VON GLAHN. supra
note 21, at 61 (offering that a divided state is "[a state] divided into two entities, each
equipped with an operative government").
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admitting the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
131
Democratic Republic to the United Nations.
Without transcending into the realm of clairvoyance, the Federal
Constitutional Court's Basic Treaty decision identified the
constitutional lever for German reunification' 3 2 -the exercise of the
right to self-determination coupled with the process mechanism of
accession.133 When the German Democratic Republic dissolved and
merged into the existing state subject to international law-Federal
135 was not held. 136
Republic of Germany, 134 a formal referendum
Thus, the exact scope of the right, especially the identity of those
entitled to make the determination-the peoples in each German state
separately or the German people as a whole-was never fully
vetted. 137 In contrast to the Constitution of the German Democratic

131.
Id.; see also Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Taiwan's Case for United Nations
Membership, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 393, 425 (1996-97) (stating that (1)
admission to the United Nations as a divided country is contingent on the equivalence
of qualifications held by the competing governments and the mutual acquiescence of
the rival governments; and (2) admission for a divided German state occurred only
after a d6tente was reached between the two rivals).
132.
36 BverfGE 1, 28-29 (1973) (F.R.G.); DECISIONS, supra note 20, at 263-64.
133.
For an analysis of Article 23 of the Basic Law, see GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIc DEUTSCHLAND, supranote 52, at 203-05 nn.1-5.
134.
German reunification featured self-determination within an enlargement
scenario.
For the right to self-determination, see Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
U.N. Doc. AIRES 2625 (1970) (including in the right "[t]he establishment of a sovereign
and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people').
135.
Massa, supra note 129, at 209 (providing that (1) state practice
acknowledges the use of plebiscites in self-determination; (2) the concept of
establishing a referendum does not in itself constitute an expression of selfdetermination but rather a mechanism for gaging the future political status of a
territory; and (3) "[g]enerally, the principle of plebiscites has been adhered to with
exceptions in cases where rival claims of sovereignty exist'); see also LAWRENCE T.
FARLEY, PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY 145
(1986) ("[p]olitical legitimacy arises from the people's will-it does not descend
deductively from the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty").
136.
PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF
GERMAN REUNIFICATION 52-53 (1997) (asserting that theoretically the Federal Republic
of Germany had no choice to accept the accession; in reality the choices were made by
the political leadership of both states); Frowein, supra note 9, at 159 (suggesting that
the outcome of the last elections in the German Democratic Republic was considered a
sufficient expression of the desire for reunification); Reimann, supra note 18, at 1998
n.20 (diagnosing that "[t]he takeover was 'friendly' because [the Government of] the
German Democratic Republic . . . cooperated"; and (2) "[a]lthough the Eastern
government actually voted for unification, it is highly questionable whether it would
have supported in all regards the manner in which unification ultimately took place").
137.
Frowein, supra note 9, at 153-54 n.10 (observing that "[i]t is a moot
question ... to what extent such a right would have existed if only a minority in the
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Republic, 138 the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany
provided for the constitutional accession of other parts of
Germany.139 This voluntary process, 14 0 which involved the extension

of the Basic Law to the newly incorporated territories,1 4 1 had already
been successfully tested during the entry of the Saar in 1956.142 The

alternative route offered by the Basic Law seemed to envisage the
election of an all-German constituent assembly tasked with drafting
a constitution for a reunited Germany. Neither the nature and
requirements of this provision nor its relationship to the accession
option were ever settled with finality. 143 The interim approach of
establishing a more or less loose confederation between the two
144
German states for a transition period was only briefly discussed.
145
The accession option prevailed because it proved more expedient.
The principal political actors considered time as being of the

[German Democratic Republic] had opted for unification and a majority could only have
been formed by including the people of the Federal Republic of Germany" and that
"[u]nder German constitutional law, as well as under public international law, it seems
that the Federal Republic would have had to respect a decision by the majority in the
[German Democratic Republic] to retain a second German state"); see also Karl
Doehring, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der V6lker als Grundsatz des V1lkerrechts. 14
BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFr FOR VOLKERRECHT 7 (1974).
138. QUINT, supra note 136, at 48 (observing that the German Democratic

Republic constitution of 1968, as revised in 1974, envisaged the division of Germany as
final and thus did not provide for unification at all).
139. Basic Law, art. 23; see also Reimann, supra note 18, at 1995 n.14
(emphasizing that (1) Article 23 of the Basic Law, in its original version, has since
become obsolete; (2) after German reunification and renunciation of all claims to the
territory east of the Oder and Neisse, now Poland, no other parts left to accede; and (3)
the original text of the provision has been replaced with a completely different
provision on the role of Germany in the European Union).
140.
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIC DEUTSCHLAND, supra note 52, at
205 n.5 (commenting that the Basic Law renounces the instrument of annexation).
141.
Kearley, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that no new state was created; rather
the Federal Republic of Germany was expanded by the incorporation of the former
German Democratic Republic); Reimann, supra note 18, at 1996 (observing that the
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany simply became the constitution for the
reunited Germany).
142.
For more detail, see Ingo von Mnch, Zum Saarvertragcom 27. O.. 1956,
18 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND 6FFENTLICHES RECHT (ZAORV) 1 (1957-58).
143.
Reimann, supra note 18, at 1995-96 (observing that the question of a
potential requirement for a new constitution upon reunification under Article 146 of
the Basic Law remained open).
144.
QUINT, supranote 136, at 47-48; see also VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 5758 (offering that "[c]onfederations are encountered when a number of independent
states are linked by treaty in a union with central governmental organs of its own,
interested with specific powers over the member states but [in contrast to federal
states] not over the citizens of those states").
145.
QUINT, supra note 136, at 82, 87 (offering that "the spirit of article 23'
triumphed over "the spirit of article 146" and that a constitutional compromise of any
sort thus did not occur).
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essence. 146 Less than a year after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the
accession process culminated in the entry into force of the Unification
14 7
Treaty (Einigungsvertrag)
and the Final Settlement with respect
148
to Germany.

III. SNAPSHOT: THE CROSS-STRAIT STALEMATE
The positions advanced by the People's Republic of China and
Taiwan reflect the deep fault lines that exist in determining and
achieving a post-reunification end state.
A. The Position of the Government of the People's Republic of China
The Government of the People's Republic of China advocates the
One-China principle as the sole appropriate template for achieving

146.
Frowein, supra note 9, at 154 n.12 (noting that "fajlthough such a
procedure was possible in theory, it certainly did not meet the requirements of the
situation in 1989-1990').
147.
Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, v.28.9.1990
(BGBl. II S. 889), 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991), amended by Agreement on the Execution and
Interpretation of the Unification Treaty, Sept. 18, 1990, v.28.9.1990 (BGB1. II S. 1239);
see also Kearley, supra note 16, at 10 (observing that (1) the Unification Treaty, which
went into effect on October 3, 1991, contains only 45 articles but has attached to it
three annexes of some 230 pages detailing how unification is to be accomplished; (2)
pursuant to Article 1, unification was achieved through the accession of the German
Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Law; (3) the
Unification Treaty also changes the Basic Law in several respects; and (4) the
Unification Treaty rendered most of the Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and
Social Union (Staatsvertrag), May 18, 1990, v.25.6.1990 (BGB1. II S. 518), 29 I.L.M.
1108 (1990), superfluous but did not abrogate it).
148.
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 101-20, at 14 (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990); Exchange of Notes
Concerning the Relations Convention and the Settlement Convention, Sept. 28 1990, 30
I.L.M. 454 (1991); Declaration Suspending the Operation of Quadripartite Rights and
Responsibilities, Oct. 1, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 555 (1991); see also Frowein, supra note 9, at
160-62 (noting that (1) "[florty-five years, three months, and six days after the four
Allied powers assumed supreme authority over Germany, they agreed to terminate
their rights; and (2) over the centuries, "German constitutional structures have
frequently been established or affected by international treaty systems," as illustrated
by the peace treaties concluded after the Thirty Years' War in 1648, the settlement
after the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, and the Versailles Treaty of 1919); Kearley, supra
note 16, at 10-11 (explaining that the final settlement agreement between Germany,
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R. resolved the issues
that remained between the World War II adversaries, "end[ed] the artificial division of
Germany and Berlin . . . [and] terminate[d] all remaining Four-Power rights and
responsibilities for Berlin and for Germany as a whole'). For a discussion of German
reunification and the European Communities, see, for example, Frowein, supra note 9,
at 160 (offering that the supranational framework "amounted in many respects to an
additional constitutional dimension').
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the orderly and peaceful reunification between the mainland and
Taiwan. 149 The three-pronged concept postulates China's sovereignty
and territorial integrity. 150 According to the doctrine, only one China
exists in the world; Taiwan forms an inalienable part of China, and
the Government of the People's Republic of China represents the sole
legal government for the whole of China. 151 The Government of the
People's Republic of China asserts that China has not split into two
states.1 52 Taiwan merely constitutes a contumacious province. 153 In
the international arena, the replacement of Taiwanese
representatives with a delegation from the People's Republic of China

TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE & INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL,
149.
THE ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE pt. II (Feb. 22, 2000). at
http-J/www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/taiwanlvhitepaper.html [hereinafter TAIWAN
AFFAIRS OFFICE, WHITE PAPER] (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) (advising that (1) "[tlhe OneChina Principle is the foundation stone for the Chinese government's policy on

Taiwan"; (2) "[o]nly by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification
[and stability in the Asia-Pacific region] be achieved"; and (3) "on the premise of the
One-China Principle, any matter can be negotiated").
Id. pt. I (asserting that the One-China principle is "both de facto and de
150.
jure... unshakable").
Id. (presenting the mainland's account of critical historic stages in support
151.
of the One-China proposition: (1) the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki of April 1895,
which led to Japanese occupation of Taiwan; (2) the Japanese attack against China of
July 1937; (3) the Proclamation of China's Declaration of War Against Japan of
December 1941, which announced the abrogation of all treaties, agreements and
contracts governing Sino-Japanese relations, as well as the intent to recover Taiwan;
(4) the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which stipulated that Japan should return to China
certain territories, including Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago; (5)
the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945, which announced that "It]he terms of the Cairo
Declaration shall be carried out"; (6) the Japanese surrender of August 1945, which
promised compliance with the obligations established in the Potsdam Proclamation; (7)
the recovery of Taiwan by the Chinese Government on October 25, 1945; (8) the
proclamation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on
October 1, 1949, which replaced the Republic of China; and (9) the long-standing
support of the One-China Principle by the Taiwanese authorities themselves).
Id. pt. IV (arguing that (1) since 1949, the Government of the People's
152.
Republic of China enjoys and exercises inseparable state sovereignty over the whole of
China, including Taiwan; (2) the international community at large recognizes the OneChina Principle; and (3) only "the intervention of foreign forces and the obstruction of
the separatist forces in Taiwan" have thus far prevented a settlement of the Taiwan
question).
153.
Id. pts. I, H, IV (advising that (1) the Government of the People's Republic
of China replaced the Government of the Republic of China and brought "the historical
status of the Republic of China to an end"; (2) the Government of Taiwan "has always
remained only a local authority in Chinese territory"; (3) "[a]lthough the two sides of
the Straits remain to be reunified, the long-term existence of this abnormal situation
has not imbued Taiwan with a status and rights in international law, nor can it change
the legal status of Taiwan as a part of China"; and (4) in light of the applicable
domestic and international law as well as the proper construction of the concepts of
people's sovereignty and self-determination, Taiwan's status cannot be changed
through a referendum).
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in the United Nations, 154 the Joint Statement between China and
Japan, 15 5 the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiques in combination
with subsequent U.S. pronouncements, 1 56 and the number of
diplomatic ties between the People's Republic of China and members
of the international community bolster the proposition of OneChina. 15 7 In sum, according to the Government of the People's
Republic of China, cross-strait relations are barred from being
subsumed under deviating formulas, including "two governments,"
"two reciprocal political entities," 'Taiwan is already a state with
independent sovereignty," "state to state relations, or at least special
state to state relations," "one China, one Taiwan" and "two
Chinas."' 5 8
The Government of the People's Republic of China envisions the
policy of "one country-two systems" for the reunified China. 159 This
approach pledges that, while the Chinese mainland will continue
with its socialist system, Taiwan will be allowed to maintain its
capitalist structures for a substantial period of time.1 60 Under this

154.
Id. pt. I (referencing the replacement of the Taiwanese representatives by
the delegation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations on October 25,
1971).
155.
Id.
156.
Id. pts. II, III (emphasizing that U.S. commitments include not to support
'Taiwan independence," "two Chinas," or "one China, one Taiwan," or Taiwan's
participation in any international organization whose membership is restricted to
sovereign states).
157.
Id. pt. I (emphasizing that the People's Republic of China entertains
diplomatic relations with 161 countries and that "[i]t
is ready to establish diplomatic
relations with all foreign governments ... willing to abide by the principles of equality,
mutual benefit and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty").
158.
Id. pt. III (admonishing that (1) "[s]eparatist forces in Taiwan are bent on
violating the One-China Principle"; (2) "[u]nder the direction of Lee Teng-hui, the
Taiwan authorities have adopted a series of measures towards actual separation; (3)
"the Taiwan authorities are seeking to transform Taiwan into an 'independent political
entity' through a 'constitutional reform,' so as to suit the needs of creating 'two
Chinas"'; and (4) "[iun foreign relations, the Taiwan authorities have spared no effort to
carry out the activities for 'expanding the international space of survival,' with the aim
of creating 'two Chinas,"' as exhibited by the attempts to join the United Nations and
the U.S.-Japanese Theater Missile Defense System).
159.
Id. pt. II (advising that (1) "[o]n Comrade Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the
Chinese government has, since 1979, adopted the policy of peaceful reunification and
gradually evolved the scientific concept of 'one country, two systems"'; (2) the concept is
premised upon the One-China Principle; and (3) the Government of the People's
Republic of China "acknowledges the differences between Taiwan on the one hand and
Hong Kong and Macao on the other and ... is prepared to apply a looser form of the
'one country, two systems' policy in Taiwan than in Hong Kong and Macao').
160.
Id. pt. IV (admonishing that (1) the "controversy about democracy and
system is an excuse for obstructing the reunification of China"; (2) "ft]o allow the two
different social systems on both sides of the Straits to coexist without imposing them on
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format, Taiwan is promised a high degree of autonomy
unencumbered by troops or administrative personnel from the
Chinese mainland. 161 The Government of the People's Republic of
China articulates its preference for a peaceful and expeditious
process 162 brought about by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan
Straits163 through dialogue, procedural consultations, and official
164
political talks.

one or the other ...is best able to embody the wishes of compatriots on both sides of
the Straits and is itself democratic"; (3) "[i]t is totally unreasonable and undemocratic
for the Taiwan authorities to seek to obstruct reunification on the pretext of the
'controversy about democracy and system' and to force the more than 1.2 billion people
living on the Chinese mainland to practice the political and economic systems in
Taiwan").
Id. (emphasizing that the wish of the "Taiwan compatriots" to "govern and
161.
administer Taiwan by themselves" will be respected and that 'Taiwan's international
space for economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, the political
status of the Taiwan authorities, and other questions" will successfully be finally
settled).
Id. pt. II; Conclusion to TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE, WHITE PAPER, supra note
162.
149 (emphasizing that (1) "as yet, the state of hostility between the two sides of the
Straits has not formally ended"; (2) the Government of the People's Republic of China
"will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, but will not commit itself to rule out
the use of force"; (3) "[p]eaceful means would be favorable to the common development
of the societies on both sides of the Straits, and to the harmony and unity of the
compatriots across the Straits"; (4) in pursuance of peaceful reunification a series of
legal and policy changes have successfully increased cross-straits visits, trade volumes,
and investments; (5) that "adhering to the One-China Principle is the basis and
prerequisite for peaceful reunification"; (6) "[i]f Taiwan denies the One-China Principle
and tries to separate Taiwan from the territory of China, the premise and basis for
peaceful reunification will cease to exist"; (7) if the United States sabotages the OneChina Principle, "the external conditions necessary for the Chinese [G]overnment to
strive for peaceful reunification" will be destroyed; (8) "if a grave turn of events occurs
leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded
and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the
peaceful settlement of cross-straits reunification through negotiations, then the
Chinese Government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures ... including the
use of force"; (9) the "Taiwan issue" must be resolved "as early as possible" and cannot
be "postponed indefinitely"; and (10) this language is "by no means directed against
Taiwan compatriots, but against the scheme to create an 'independent Taiwan' and
against the foreign forces interfering with the reunification of China").
Id. pt. I1(stating that "[r]esolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal affair
163.
of China" and that "there is no call for aid by foreign forces").
164. Id. (admonishing that (1) "negotiations should be held and an agreement
reached on an official end to the state of hostility between the two sides under the
[One-China] principle"; (2) the successful format of the "Wang Daohan-Kao Chen-fu
talks" of 1993 and 1998 should serve as fruitful examples of interactions based on equal
footing; and (3) as soon as possible, direct trade, postal, and air and shipping services
should be started).
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B. The Positionof the Taiwanese Government
The Taiwanese Government maintains that, until the successful
conclusion of the unification process, the definition of One-China
should be subject to the respective interpretations of each side. 165
Pursuant to the Taiwanese position, China has split into two
separate, sovereign, and mutually independent states featuring
highly divergent political and economic systems. 166 The Republic of
165.
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN'S FIRST
PRESS CONFERENCE, OPENING REMARKS AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (June 20, 2000),
at http://www.taiwanstudies.org/issues/view story.php3?24 (on file with author)
[hereinafter CHEN SHUI-BIAN PRESS CONFERENCE] (stating that "[i]f we are to say that
there was an agreement, then it was that we 'agreed to disagree' . . . [wie agreed that
the two sides could have their own opinions'); MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE
YAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PRESS RELEASE ON THE "ONE CHINA" ISSUE (June 28, 2000),
at http://www.taiwanstudies.org/issues/view-story.php3?14
(on file with author)
(explaining that (1) when meeting in Hong Kong in October 1992, representatives from
the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China discussed the question of

One-China; (2) in an attempt to break the stalemate, the Republic of China suggested
"put[ting] this debate aside" and allowing "each side to have its own respective
interpretation"; (3) the People's Republic of China committed to "respect and accept
once" this suggestion; (4) the two sides never reached consensus on the One-China
Principle; and (5) the three program definition of One-China advanced under the
interpretation of the People's Republic of China was unacceptable to the Republic of
China); MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE YAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA, How WE
VIEW BEIJING'S WHITE PAPER: "ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE" (Feb.
22, 2000), at http:lwww.mac.gov.tw/english/MacPolicy/890222e.htm (last visited Apr.
8, 2001) (proposing that (1) the definition of One-China should be subject to respective
interpretations reached by the two sides in 1992; (2) such a consensus would serve to
circumvent the issue of political identity; and (3) this approach would facilitate an early
solution of the cross-strait issues); MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE YUAN,
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, STATEMENT ON MAINLAND CHINA'S WHITE PAPER (Feb. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter MAC STATEMENT] (on file with author) (making the criticism that (1) the
People's Republic of China "unilaterally narrows the definition of '[O]ne China' [in an
attempt to impose it on us and the international community], meanwhile, over-expands
the definition of 'Taiwan's independence'; and (2) "[a]s a result, the room for '[O]ne
China respectively interpreted by each side' is intentionally squeezed'); SU CHI,
CHAIRMAN, MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE YUAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
PRESS CONFERENCE:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
(Feb. 25,
2000),
at
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/MacNews/enews/89022502e.htm (on file with author)
[hereinafter SU CHI PRESS CONFERENCE] (asserting that (1) the phrases of "special
state-to-state relationship" and "One China interpreted respectively by each side" do
not contradict each other, since Lee Teng-hui's formula is characterized as the
Taiwanese description of the cross-strait status at present period of time; (2) the 1992
agreement successfully gave rise to the subsequent talks between the two
associations-the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits-in 1993, 1994, and 1995; and (3) the two sides should follow
the 1992 consensus so as to bypass the differences regarding sovereignty and the
definition of One-China).
166.
MAC STATEMENT, supra note 165 (emphasizing that (1) the mainland policy
of the ROC government has consistently been based on the respect for separate rule of
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China, founded in 1912, exercises jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen, and Matsu, whereas the People's Republic of China,
established in 1949, controls the mainland. 167 The Taiwanese
Government disputes the contention of the Government of the
People's Republic of China that the Republic of China has terminated
its historical status. 168 In consequence, One-China does not currently
exist. 169 It can only be achieved in the future through unification. 170
17 1 pragmatic, 172
The Taiwanese Government calls for a peaceful,

the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; and (2) the stark contrast between the two sides
features democracy against totalitarianism and peace versus violence); PRESIDENr
CHEN'S INAUGURAL SPEECH: TAIWAN STANDS UP: ADVANCING TO AN UPLIFTING ERA

(May 20, 2000), at http:/wwv.mac.govltwlenglishlMacPolicylcbO520e.htm (last visited
Apr. 8, 2001) [hereinafter CHEN SHUI-BIAN INAUGURATION SPEECH] (opining that "due
to the long period of separation, the two sides have developed vastly different political
systems and ways of life, obstructing empathy and friendship between the people on
the two sides, and even creating a wall of divisiveness and confrontation").
167.
MAC STATEMENT, supra note 165.
168.
See id.
169.
SU CHI PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (explaining that (1) One-China
should be characterized in the future tense; (2) "[s]ince unification is not here today,
Mainland China calls itself the People's Republic of China"; and (3) "we are the
Republic of China").
170. MAC STATEMENT, supra note 165 (expressing the hope that the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of China "can gradually move toward a new China
with democracy, freedom and equitable prosperity according to the short, middle and
long term phases of the Guidelines for National Unification").
171.
MAC STATEMENT, supra note 165 (admonishing that (1) the People's
Republic of China has repeatedly threatened the Republic of China "with military
bluff'; and (2) the White Paper exposes the "aggressive nature and hegemonic mindset"
of the People's Republic of China); SU CHI PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165
(suggesting that the two sides should avoid conflicts, remove the potential for war,
foster peaceful relations, and pursue mutual benefit).
172. CHEN SHUI-BIAN PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (e.xplaining, in
response to Question 7, that (1) "[t]he major problem is reopening dialogue between the
two sides of the strait, like in the Koo-Wang Talks"; and (2) "[ilf we cannot reach this
step, the 'three links' (direct mail, transportation, and trade with the Chinese
mainland) and the 'three mini links' (direct mail, transportation, and trade with the
Chinese mainland) are hopeless"); MAC STATE.MENT, supra note 165 (expressing the
desire that "the two sides... should, under the consensus of 'one China respectively
interpreted' restore bilateral talks as soon as possible and strengthen exchanges to
develop constructive cross-strait relations with joint efforts); SU CHI PRESS
CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (explaining that (1) practical issues include the three
direct links (mail, transportation, commerce), diplomatic affairs, and cultural
exchanges; (2) differences in defining One-China have created a stalemate, since both
sides have been very firm; and (3) Taiwan used to treat Mainland China as a rebel
group, "hiowever, nine years ago, under President Lee's instruction, the ROC
government made a pragmatic revision ... [to] no longer treat them as a rebel group,
which is a goodwill gesture"). For earlier pronouncements, see, for example, GUOJIA
TONGYI GANGLING [GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION], PASSED BY THE
NATIONAL UNIFICATION COUNCIL, FEB. 23, 1991 AND BY THE EXECUTIVE YUAN AT ITS
2223RD MEETING, MAR. 14, 1991, reprinted in JOHN I. COOPER, WORDS ACROSS THE
TAIWAN STRAIT:. A CRITIQUE OF BEIJING'S "WHITE PAPER" ON CHINA'S REUNIFICATION
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parity-based, 173 and cooperative 174 approach leading to a new
China. 175 While reserving all future options, 176 the Taiwanese
Government has pledged not to declare formal independence, change

the island's name to Republic of Taiwan, insert into the constitution

125-27 (1995) (envisaging the achievement of a "democratic, free and equitably
prosperous China" through a gradual three-stage process of reunification that includes:
(1) in the short term, the organization of reciprocal exchanges; (2) the pledge of trust
and co-operation through the of official communication channels and direct postal,
transport, and communication links; and (3) in the long term, the establishment of a
consultation organization for unification, which would develop a new constitutional
system based on the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan).
173.
MAC STATEMENT, supra note 165 (rejecting the format of the principal and
the subordinate); SU CHI PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (noting that the
Government of the People's Republic of China proposed talks between political parties).
174.
CHEN SHUI-BIAN PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (calling upon Mr.
Jiang Zemin for a moment of "handshakes and reconciliation," along the model of the
Koreas and the past contacts, dialogue, or negotiations conducted between Taipei's
Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait in Beijing); SU CHI PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (stating that the
imposition of a "time element" or deadline for talks will further impede cross-strait
exchanges, talks, and progress toward peaceful unification and that "[t]en years ago,
when the exchanges between two sides were not allowed, Taiwan's public opinion polls
showed that more than 60% of Taiwan's people supported unification, but less than
10% do so now").
175.
CHEN SHUI-BIAN INAUGURATION SPEECH, supra note 166 (offering that (1)
"[the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background and similar historical
experiences should bring mutual understanding between the people on the two sides of
the Taiwan Strait, setting a solid foundation for pursuing freedom, democracy and
human rights together"; (2) "[u]nder the leadership of Mr. Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Jiang
Zemin, the mainland has created a miracle of economic openness"; and (3) 'in Taiwan,
in over a half century, not only have we created a miracle economy, we have also
created the political marvel of democracy"); MAC STATEMENT, supra note 165
(expressing (1) the support for the integration of the mainland system into the
international free economic system at an early date as well as for reforms of the
mainland's political system and social structure because of their positive effects on
social stability, long-term democratization, cross-strait relations, and national
unification in the future; and (2) the hope that through dialogue, exchanges, and a
process of assimilation the two sides can become a democratic, liberal, and equitably
prosperous new China).
176.
CHEN SHUI-BIAN PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (emphasizing, in
response to Question 10, that (1) in lieu of pre-established premises or conclusions,
Taiwan will proceed with an open mind "on the entire matter in order to leave plenty of
room for input from leaders on the Chinese mainland side"; and (2) "[o]nly the 23
million residents of Taiwan have the right to decide which way they will go in the
future'); SU CHI PRESS CONFERENCE, supra note 165 (advising that (1) "[tjhe Republic
of China, as a democracy, is open to a full spectrum of opinions"; (2) "the process of
opinion-articulation is wide open, but the process of decision-making is very thorough";
(3) "[tlhe process will include all possibilities for all of the people in Taiwan to decide in
the future, not by the person in charge today"; (4) "[t]he 'confederation model' [as one
version of 'respective interpretations] still remains theoretical and is not a government
policy"; and (5) with respect to 'Taiwan independence" or an "independent Taiwan,"
"[t]he majority in Taiwan as shown in public opinion polls supports the status quo, i.e.
neither independence nor unification")
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the formula of a "special state-to-state relationship," or promote a
referendum with respect to the questions of independence or
177
unification.
C. Discussion
The construction and the role of the One-China principle reside
at the core of the Chinese reunification controversy. The People's
Republic of China asserts that Taiwan must return to mainland rule
under a One Country-Two Systems arrangement, whereas Taiwan
requires the full democratization of the mainland prior to a merger.
The One-China doctrine embodies for the People's Republic of
China its fundamental national interest to complete the territorial
scope of the Chinese nation. 178 After the return of Hong Kong and
Macau, the People's Republic of China still faces an unfinished
national reunification agenda and the recurrence of centrifugal
movements in Xizang (Tibet), Neimeng (Inner Mongolia), and
Xinjiang. 179 The People's Republic of China seeks to insulate the
reunification process from internationalization. It considers Taiwan
an inalienable part of its sovereign domain firmly held and not
adjudicable under international law.180 From the perspective of the
People's Republic of China, this posture entails significant
consequences. A Taiwanese declaration of independence would be
viewed as an illegal secession.1 8 1 Moreover, any involvement of other

177.
CHEN SHUI-BIAN INAUGURATION SPEECH, supra note 166 (making this four.
fold pledge subject to the condition that the People's Republic of China has no intention
of using military force against Taiwan).
178.
E.g., Forward to TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 149
(emphasizing that the "[s]ettlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete
reunification of China embodies [sic] the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation");
Zhengyuan Fu, China's Perceptionof the Taiwan Issue, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 321, 327 (1996-97) (noting that, in 1980, Deng Xiaoping identified the
reunification with Taiwan as one prong in the three-fold mission of the Chinese

Communist Party); see also Guiguo Wang & Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two
Systems: Theory Into Practice, 7 PAC. RM L. & POLY J. 279, 281 (1998) (explaining
that since Chiang Kai-Shek's defeated Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan in 1949, the
Government of the People's Republic of China has proclaimed Taiwan a renegade
province).

179.

E.g., Sean Cooney, Why Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's

"One Country Two Systems" Model for Reunifwation with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. &

POL'Y J. 497, 498 (1997) (observing that "Beijing faces one remaining obstacle to its
goal of national reunification, what it calls the 'Taiwan question*); Foreward to

TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 149 (stating that "[tihe Chinese
government has worked persistently toward this goal in the past 50 years"); Fu, supra
note 178, at 324 (opining that "nationalism has become the only effective ideological
glue which binds the 1.2 billion people as a nation under the rule of the [Chinese
Communist Party]").
180.
Chang & Lim, supranote 131, at 416.
181.
TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, pt. III.
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nations would be construed as an unlawful intervention in Chinese
internal affairs. 18 2 The People's Republic of China justifies the
continued reservation to use force' 8 3 and the persistent blockade of
Taiwanese attempts at gaining diplomatic recognition and
participation in international organizations as appropriate levers to
uphold the One-China linchpin. 184 In this light, international law
and foreign relations 185 become utilitarian tools to serve national

182.
Id. pt. IV.
183.
E.g., Glenn R. Butterton, Signals, Threats, and Deterrence: Alive and Well
in the Taiwan Strait, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 97 (1997) (listing as potential triggers a
declaration of independence, foreign intervention, or serious civil unrest on Taiwan);
Fu, supra note 178, at 329 (identifying similar circumstances); Lang Kao, A New
Relationship Across the Taiwan Strait, 27 ISSUES & STUDIES 44, 53-57 (1991) (adding

the scenario of a Taiwanese refusal to negotiate reunification); James Pringle, Peking
Ends Military Manoeuvres off Taiwan, TIMES (London), Mar. 26, 1996, at 11 (stating
that threats to use force are backed up by war games conducted in the Straits of
Taiwan during Taiwanese elections, as illustrated during the 1996 presidential
elections); Omar Saleem, The Spratley Islands Dispute: China Defines the New
Millennium, 15 AM. U. INVL L. REV. 527, 532 (2000) (explaining that under the 1995
Positive Defense Strategy, Jixi Fang,the People's Republic of China has established a
military security perimeter bounding an area from its southeast to its northeast coast
and that this belt encompasses Taiwan); see also Fu, supra note 178, at 323 (offering
that, although the traditional Chinese political culture has often been characterized as
Confucian, the Legalists, fajia,"who were more Machiavellian than Machiavelli," have
shaped Chinese Realpolitik under the motto "enrich the state and strengthen the
army"-fuguo qiangbing).
184.
Kao, supranote 183, at 53-57.
185.
For the basic international law theories, see Saleem, supra note 183, at
543-45, 554, 559, 560 (explaining that (1) the sovereign or enforcement theory envisions
international law as a series of mandates established and enforced by an overseer; (2)
the treaty theory approximates international law to a contractual agreement of the
parties; (3) the natural law theory invokes the law of God exercised by rational beings
through international treaties, customs, and general legal principles; (4) the realist
theory, which places international law into the context of domination, balance of power,
or total chaos; (5) the People's Republic of China, prior to the leadership of Deng
Xioaping and particularly during the Mao Zedong era, embraced the Austin-Hart
position that international law was simply a form of international morality; (6) between
1965 and 1979 the amount of scholarship in international law was meager in the
People's Republic of China; and (7) the People's Republic of China considers treaties as
the most important source of international law because they reflect the actual
agreement between nations). For the role of perception in foreign relations, see, for
example, ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1976) (analyzing in detail the mechanics and significance of the perception
theory); Fu, supra note 178, at 322 (summarizing that "[p]olicy making, especially
decisions involving foreign relations, can be best understood only by comprehending
what the decision-makers ... define as the national interest and their perception of the
international and domestic environment); Samuel S. Kim, China and the World in
Theory and Practice,in CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA (Samuel S. Kim ed., 1994) (presenting the perception theory with
respect to the People's Republic of China).
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In sum, the One-China doctrine exhibits the psycho-

cultural disposition of the People's Republic of China that connects
the achievement of reunification with the full restoration of Chinese
87
national honor.'
After decades of competition between Taiwan and the People's
Republic of China for the right to constitute and represent China, 8 8

186.
Saleem, supra note 183, at 543-60 (explaining that (1) the "unequal
treaties" have created in the People's Republic of China a sense of mistrust of
international relations; (2) as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. the
People's Republic of China has sought to influence international relations and world
political decisions in its own interest; (3) for example, the veto policy of the People's
Republic of China in the Security Council with respect to Guatemala, Haiti. and
Macedonia has been designed to urge the severance of relations with Taiwan and the
recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China).
187.
E.g., Cooney, supra note 179, at 548 n.329 (observing that the reunification
project is invested with near spiritual significance, as expressed in the phrase "the
sacred mission and lofty purpose of all Chinese people"-"suoyou Zhongguoren de
Shensheng Shiming he Chonggai Mubiao"); Fu, supra note 178, at 321, 332-34
(diagnosing that (1) in the eyes of the leaders of the People's Republic of China the
achievement of reunification forms "an essential component of the national psyche"; (2)
independent of a democratization on the mainland, "[a]ny act of formal secession by
Taiwan [would be] perceived by the Chinese people as an insult" . . . and "the
imposition of [an intolerable] national shame"; and (3) if Taiwan declared independence
with the support of the United States or Japan, the specter of foreign aggression would
rise again); Kao, supra note 183, at 53-57 (explaining that the nationalistic appeal is
based on traditional Chinese ideas that China can only be strong and prosperous if it is
unified). For a psychocultural analysis of Chinese foreign policy, see, for example,
CHIH-YU SHIH, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLIcY: A PSYCHOCULTURAL VIEW
(1990).
188.
Cheri Attix, Comment, Between the Deuil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are
Taiwan's TradingPartnersImplying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W.
IN'L L.J. 357 (1995) (noting that "[flrom 1949 to 1991, the People's Republic of China
and Taiwan were locked in a diplomatic battle over which would be the internationally
recognized representative of China"); Butterton, supra note 183, at 67-68 n.35
(explaining that, subsequent to the 1996 "war games" crisis, as a symbol of autonomy,
President Lee "launched a plan to dismantle the official provincial government of
Taiwan, which to a considerable degree [had] structurally paralleled and functionally
duplicated the national government"); Fu, supra note 178, at 326-40 (observing that (1)
during the 1960s and most of the 1970s, both sides believed that there was only "one
China, and Taiwan [was] a part of China"; (2) while no longer insisting on the "recovery
of the mainland" since the 1970, the Taiwanese leaders have remained highly
suspicious of the leadership of the People's Republic of China; (3) since the mid-1980s,
the People's Republic of China has been confronted with a stronger voice for
independence from Taiwan; (4) until 1987, the official position of the Taiwanese
Government toward the Government of mainland China has been "three no's"-the
rejection of contact, negotiation, and compromise); Tzu-wen Lee, The International
Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1 UCLA J. INTr'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
351, 354 (1996-97) (stating that, on its own initiative, Taiwan implicitly recognized the
People's Republic of China in 1991 and that in 1994, Taiwan officially relinquished the
competition with the People's Republic of China for the right to represent China in the
international community); Sean D. Murphy, ContemporaryPracticeof the United States
Relating to InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 895 (1999) (diagnosing that the
shared One-China policy had allowed both governments to maintain the fiction that
each was the legitimate ruler of the other and that reunification might someday occur).
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Taiwan now claims its own separate room in the international
space. 189 This posture, which is based on the assertion that the
People's Republic of China has not superseded the Republic of China,
connotes the assertion of statehood status. 190
The status of Taiwan involves different layers of controversy
among legal scholars. The traditional international law standards for
statehood posit that a human community effectively exercises full
self-government over a defined space. 19 1 The state population
consists of the physical citizenry; 192 the state territory constitutes an
area under the territorial sovereignty and free disposition of the
state; 193 and the state power refers to the sovereign right to exercise
government power over persons and things. 194 All statehood
elements must effectively exist with a perspective of sustained

But see Chen, supra note 1, at 225 (commenting that "the historical policy of 'one
country, two governments' embraced by both [the People's Republic of China] and
Taiwan has belied the reality of 'two countries, two governments' for nearly half a
century").
189.
CHEN SHUI-BIAN INAUGURATION SPEECH, supra note 166 (speaking of
'Taiwan's room for survival in the international arena").
190.
Jau-Yuan Hwang, Constitutional Change and Political Transition in
Taiwan Since 1986: The Role of Legal Institutions 259-72, 286-87 (1995) (unpublished
S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard University Library)
(arguing that Taiwan has adopted a divided-states approach).
191.
E.g., Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1, July
4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495 (1992) (declaring that "a state is commonly defined as a
community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organized
political authority" and that "such a State is characterized by sovereignty); Convention
on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, 25 (providing for the following statehood qualifications: "(a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with other States); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 140
(1991) (adding that other factors may be relevant, such as self-determination and
recognition).
192.
SCHWEITZER, supra note 108, at 166-68 nn.406-09 (explaining that (1)
citizenship is acquired through domestic law within the international law boundary of
a genuine connection or link; (2) acquisition grounds include birth to citizens (jus
sanguinis), birth on the territory (jus sol), marriage, adoption, legitimation, and
naturalization; (3) the loss of citizenship is a matter for each state; and (4) due to the
margin of maneuver for each state, double citizenship or statelessness may occur).
193.
Id. at 172-73 nn.417-19 (providing that the territorial authority over an
area constitutes a lesser prerogative than full territorial sovereignty and that
international law distinguishes between the land territory and the coastal sea).
194.
Id. at 176-77 nn.430-32 (adding that state power manifests itself through
independence in the external arena and, internally, through full self-government and
that legitimacy does not play a determinative role in this context). For discussions of
democratic legitimacy as an additional criterion, see, for example, Chang & Lim, supra
note 131, at 398-400. See generally SHAW, supra note 191, at 144; Winston Hsiao, The
Development of Human Rights in the Republic of China on Taiwan: Ramifications of
Recent Democratic Reforms and Problemsof Enforcement, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 161
(1995).
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duration, especially when a civil war may have given rise to a new
state.195 In application of these criteria some voices in the literature
find that Taiwan merely hosts a consolidated, local, de facto
government-in-exile exercising only territorial authority 96 over its
population. 197 Two principal findings are alleged in support of this
assessment. Sovereignty over the island has been suspended. 198
Moreover, independence' 9 9 through self-determination 20 0 has never

195. E.g., Lee, supra note 188, at 382-86.
196.
SCHWErrZER, supranote 108, at 172 n.417 (contrasting territorial authority
with full territorial sovereignty).
197. Chang & Lim, supra note 131, at 404 (explaining that the aborigines
(yuanzhumin), the Hoklo (Fuldenese Chinese descent), the Hakka (Chinese descent),
and the "Chinese mainlanders" comprise the main ethnic groups on Taiwan); Cooney.
supra note 179, at 499 n.7 (providing that the Taiwanese people includes the Minnan
Chinese who commenced emigrating many centuries ago, the "mainlanders" who fled in
1949, the Hakka minority, and the indigenous people); see also Fu, supra note 178, at
333 (observing "reverse discrimination' against the so.called 'outside province people,'
people whose parents were not born in Taiwan (the waishing ren)").
198. E.g., Lung-chu Chen & W.M. Reisman, IWho Owns Taiwan: A Search for
International Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599, 611 n.43 (1972) (arguing that sovereignty has
been unresolved because the Peace Treaty with Japan left the issue open); Gene T.
Hsiao, The Legal Status of Taiwan in the Normalizationof Sino.American Relations, 14
RUTGERS L.J. 839, 840 (1983) (offering that, after the war, technical sovereignty over
the island was not settled); see also Butterton, supra note 183, at 66 (observing that
"[the ambiguous status of Taiwan is at least partly rooted in the victorious Allied
Powers' plans during and following World War WF); Lee, supra note 188, at 368 (noting
that "[t]he question of Taiwan's legal status would have been much simpler had Taiwan
always remained part of Chinese territory... if the episode of cession to Japan, return
to the Chinese administration, (and] renouncement of right in the two Peace Treaties
by Japan had not occurred").
199.
The best evidence of an entity's assertion of independent statehood is a
formal declaration of independence, which makes an official request to assert sovereign
status and is an invitation to the members of the international community to extend
their recognition. For the significance of independence, see, for example, SHAW, supra
note 191 (explaining that independence constitutes the "essence" of the capacity to
enter into relations with other states"); VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 56 (offering
independence as the "final and decisive requirement"); Massa, supra note 129, at 206
(offering that, in the case of an illegal unilateral declaration of independence, the
potential international recognition may legitimize the new legal order and that "[t]he
success of breakaway colonies demonstrates the viability of a declaration of
independence"); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (1979) (maintaining that "Taiwan is not a State, because it
does not claim to be"). Others have argued that Taiwan's constitutional reformswhich, inter alia,confine the electorate to Taiwan-and the separating declarations of
the Taiwanese Government amount to a "quasi declaration of independence." E.g.,
Cooney, supra note 179, at 508 n.51 (referring to an unpublished dissertation in
support of the proposition that the Taiwanese Government does not openly declare
itself a state due to the People's Republic of China's unlawful threat of force and that
the failure to make an open declaration does not constitute a denial of statehood); Jin
Huang &Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems,"Three Law Families,and
FourLegal Regions: The Emerging Inter-RegionalConflicts of Laws in China, 5 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 302 n.85 (1995) (observing that independence models under
discussion in Taiwan include "yizhongyitai(one China, one Taiwan), liang'gezhongguo
(two Chinas) or alternatively, taidu (Taiwan independence) and durai (an independent

518

VANDERBILT ]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:481

Taiwan)"). For the posture of Taiwan President Chen, see, for example, Harvey
Feldman, Chen's First Month Demonstrates His Adroit, Prudent Approach, in 3 TRI
PUBLICATIONS, TAIWAN PERSPECTIVE (June 2000) (on file with author) (emphasizing
President Chen's triple pledge not to declare formal independence, change the island's
name to Republic of Taiwan, or insert the "special state-to-state relationship" language
into the constitution); see also Attix, supra note 188, at 378 (stating that the political
career of the current President of Taiwan, Mr. Chen, has been devoted to the fight for
democracy and independence); Attix, supra note 188, at 377 n.171 (stating that, during
a campaign, Mr. Chen flew the Taiwanese national flag at his campaign headquarters);
Fu, supra note 178, at 333 (noting the Japanese loyalty exhibited by some Taiwanese
advocating independence); Huang & Qian, supra, at 302 n.85 (observing that the
Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan "has placed Taiwanese independence at the
top of its agenda").
200.
Chen, supra note 1, at 241 (characterizing self-determination as premised
on "the right of a people to declare and establish its own sovereign state freely'). For
self-determination in the context of the rise of new nations, see, for example, The Aland
Island Question, at 27, League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106 (1921) ('To concede to
minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of
withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their
good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate
anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very
idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.'); Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, supra note 134; LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION 87 (1978)
('The history of the United Nations practice lends substantial support to the thesis that
the principle of [self-determination], as interpreted by that body, is primarily a vehicle
for decolonization, not an authorization of secession.'); SHAW, supra note 191, at 145
(offering self-determination as a potential additional criterion of statehood, in addition
to its role in the assessment of government operations); Chen, supra note 1, at 241 n.99
(noting that "[t]he concept of self-determination has its inception in a moral mandate
directed at decolonizing European and Japanese colonies during the period following
World War II"); S. Chowdhury, The Status and Norms of Self-Determination in
ContemporaryInternationalLaw, in FREDERICK E. SNYDER & SURAKIART SATHIRATHAI,
THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-99 (1987) (discussing four
norms of the right and manner of self-determination: (1) beneficiaries of the right and
the manner of its exercise; (2) territories and situations where applicable; (3) modes of
implementation; and (4) duties of the state-rights of the people); Massa, supra note 129,
at 213 (observing that the Charter of the United Nations mentions the term "selfdetermination" twice in conjunction with the goals of promoting "friendly relations
among nations" and the "equal" rights of "peoples'); Massa, supra note 129, at 214
(stating that the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "reinforces the right of
self-determination in the traditional colonial context); Massa, supra note 129, at 183,
208, 218-19 (observing that (1) "the vast majority of international law applies to
challenges arising from non-consenting parties with at least one party demanding
independence and another upholding the status quo"; (2) more than one hundred
insurgent groups currently aspire to break up or redefine national borders; (3) the
former Czechoslovak state proceeded along the modus operandi provided by its 1968
Constitution and, in 1993, became the first entity to separate peacefully into two
independent states through a negotiated settlement; and (4) "[t]he the ascent of
'ministates' such as San Marino, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Andorra into
the United Nations reflects a trend toward regionalism'); see also Chen & Reisman,
supra note 198, at 662 (proposing that an internationally supervised plebiscite of the
Taiwanese enable them to determine their future status); Huang & Qian, supra note
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been activated. 20 1 Other commentators argue that Taiwan meets the
basic statehood elements, 202 especially when viewed in the context of
its democratization2 0 3 and economic standing in the world
20 4
economy.
An interlinked and controversial threshold involves measuring
the rise of statehood as a function of international stature accrued
through recognition. 205 The constitutive theory holds that a new
state attains international legal personality only through recognition
by other states.2 0 6 The declaratory theory, which criticizes the

199, at 302 n.85 (asserting "[t]he possible reunification of Taiwan is especially
contentious in Taiwan").
201.
Massa, supra note 129, at 209 (offering that "[g]eneraly the principle of
plebiscites has been adhered to with exceptions in cases where rival claims of
sovereignty exist").
202.
E.g., Cooney, supra note 179, at 508 n.51 (finding that Taiwan "arguably"
satisfies the standards); Peter R. Rosenblatt, IWat is Sovereignty? The Cases of
Taiwan and Micronesia,32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 797, 798 (1998) (noting that Taiwan does
meet the criteria).
203.
Hsiao, supra note 194, at 180 (anchoring democratization to the end of
martial law on July 15, 1987); Edwin A. Winckler, Taiwan Transition?, in POLITICAL
CHANGE IN TAIWAN 221, 224 (Tun-jen Cheng & Stephan Haggard eds., 1992)
(describing the Taiwanese democratization as an evolution from "hard authoritarian"
rule (1945-1960) to a "remunerative hard authoritarianism" (1960.1975) to "soft
authoritarianism" (1975-1990)).
204.
Chen, supra note 1, at 238-39 (identifying Taiwan's trade and economic
power as a strong statehood indicator); Lee, supra note 188, at 355 (explaining that
Taiwan has a strong claim to statehood in view of its economy, gross national product,
trade volume, and level of foreign investment).
205.
For definitions, see, for example, Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486-87
(1992) (articulating a common position on the process of recognition of such new states
and referring specifically to the principle of self-determination); HERSH LAurERPACHT,
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1947) (providing that the "recognition of States
is not a matter governed by law but a question of policy"); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER &
E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 566 (6th ed. 1976) (offering that
recognition constitutes "the acknowledgment of a situation with the intention of
admitting the legal implications of such a state of affairs); VON GLAHN, supra note 21,
at 86-7, 87-93, 93-110 (distinguishing between express.explicit and implied.tacit
recognition and between recognition of states and recognition of governments); M.J.
Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 Am. J. INr'L L. 31,
50 (1983) (providing that "[i]f recognition of governments is to perform its proper
functions, and confusion among acknowledgment of status, communication, and
approval is to be avoided, recognition decisions must be based solely on whether the
new government has control of its state"); see also Butterton, supra note 183, at 68
(adding that "one clear exception to the aiding.a-recognized.government rule arises in
the form of state-to-non-state conflict known as civil war"); Oscar Schachter, The Right
of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1645 (1984) (observing that
"recognized governments have a right to receive external military assistance and
outside states are free to furnish such aid").
206.
1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1st ed. 1905) (offering that "[a]
state is and becomes an International Person through recognition only and
exclusively"); see also Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 129, at 759 (finding that
scholarship in the United States leans toward the constitutive theory of statehood).
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constitutive approach for creating a complex relativity matrix with
respect to recognizing and non-recognizing states, provides that
recognition merely affirms the legal status of statehood once the
three basic elements are met.20 7 The modified declaratory theoryan intermediate approach-responds to scenarios when recognition is
withheld through the figure of the de facto regime, which, while not
being completely denied international law subject status, holds a
20 8
reduced minimal standard of rights and duties.
Taiwan exhibits a mixed recognition record. 20 9
It is fully
recognized only by a limited number of nations. 2 10 Many countries
recognize the People's Republic of China, 2 11 while conducting unofficial

207.
E.g., PAUL REUTER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 177-78 (1993) (offering
that "[1]a pratique international admet en g6n~ral que l'existence de ces trois 616ments
est une condition n6cessaire de l'existence d'un Etat, mais pour que cette existence soit
opposable pleinement A un autre Etat ilfaut que cet Etat ait reconnu cette existence");
SHAW, supra note 191, at 142 (noting that "the more sparse international recognition
is, the more attention will be focused upon proof of actual adherence to the [statehood]
criteria concerned" and that recognition by others impacts the capacity of entities to
enter into relations with other countries); VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 87 (providing
that "[t]he new state exists, regardless of whether it has been recognized by other
states, when it has met the factual requirements of statehood); see also CRAWFORD,
supranote 199, at 20 (stating that the declaratory theory constitutes the more accepted
position in international law); Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 129, at 759 (suggesting
that scholars in Continental Europe favor the declarative theory of statehood).
208.
SCHWEITZER, supra note 108, at 179 n.438.
209.
Lee, supra note 188, at 370 (observing that if Taiwan claims to be the sole
government that represents the State of China, then the choice between competing
governments is at issue; and that by contrast, if Taiwan does not claim to be the sole
representative government of China, then a case of recognition of states arises); Massa,
supra note 129, at 207 (suggesting that "[c]ompeting claims of governance undercut
international recognition").
210.
ROBERT G. SUTTER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAIWAN: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S. POLICY CHOICES 4 (July 1998) (noting that most countries
that have recognized Taiwan are small states in Central America, Africa, and the
South Pacific); Lee, supra note 188, at 387 (providing that Taiwan has been recognized
by thirty states). But see Taiwan, Macedonia and East Timor (Jan. 31, 1999), at
http://www.taiwandc.orglnws-9904.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) (suggesting that
Taiwan's newly established political ties with Macedonia may serve as a foot-in-the.
door to the rest of Europe). See also Attix, supra note 188, at 386 (arguing that
"[i]nternational recognition of the division of China at the Taiwan Straits would make
those States a frontier for purposes of the use of force and take the issue of Taiwan out
of Beijing's internal domain"); Lee, supra note 188, at 354 (finding that the potential
creation of two Chinas through Taiwan's pursuit of international recognition is a
question for the recognizing state).
211.
Lee, supra note 188, at 357-59 (presenting nine categories of communiques,
that involve, albeit not universally, 123 countries and the People's Republic of China:
(1) 33 countries recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate
government of China (or the sole legitimate government representing all Chinese
people) and "recognize" its claim that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of
China or an inalienable part of China; (2) eight countries recognize the People's
Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China and acknowledge the

20011

DETENTE ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

relations with Taiwan pursuant to the "Japanese formula."2 12 A similar

People's Republic of China's claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's
Republic of China; (3) 16 countries recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole
legitimate government of China and "take note" of the People's Republic of China's
claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China; (4) two
countries recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of
China and "understand and respect" the People's Republic of China claim that Taiwan
is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China; (5) one country respects and
supports the position of the People's Republic of China over Taiwan; (6) two countries
recognize that the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of
China and respect their claim that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of
China; (7) one country, the United States, recognizes the People's Republic of China as
the sole legitimate government of China and "acknowledges" the Chinese position that
Taiwan is part of China; (8) 41 countries recognize the People's Republic of China as
the sole legitimate government of China without even mentioning the Taiwan
sovereignty issue; and (9) 19 countries neither recognize the People's Republic of China
as the sole legitimate government of China nor mention the Taiwan sovereignty issue);
see also Attix, supra note 188, at 381 (providing that (1) the non-recognition of Taiwan
by most nations is a result of the pressure exerted by the People's Republic of China;
(2) "[t]here is no indication that these states are withholding recognition because they
find Taiwan's existence repugnant or its actions in violation of any jus cogens principle
of international law"; and (3) Taiwan's trading partners are caught between Taiwan's
burgeoning democracy and desire for international status and the mainland's historical
claim to Taiwan as a part of the former Chinese empire). Most nations recognizing the
People's Republic of China simply "take note of' or "acknowledge" its claim over Taiwan
rather than "accepting" or "supporting" it). Attix, supra note 188, at 385-86.
For the basic principles underlying Sino-U.S. relations, see the Shanghai
Communique, Feb. 27, 1972, reprinted in H.C. HINTON, 5 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF

CHINA 1949-1979: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 2363 (1980); the Sino-U.S. Joint
Communique, Dec. 15, 1978, reprinted in HINTON, supra, at 2951 n.670; the SinoAmerican Communique, Aug. 17, 1982, reprinted in China, U.S. Issue Joint
Communique, BEIJING REV., Aug. 23, 1982, at 14. For a more recent pronouncement
from the Clinton Administration, see Press Briefing, James P. Rubin, U.S. Dep't of
State (July 6, 1998), at http'./secretary.state.gov/wwlbriefingsJ98O7I980706db.html
(on file with author) ("We do not support Taiwan independence; we do not support
Taiwanese membership in organizations where statehood is required; we do not
support a two-China policy or a one-Chinalone-Taiwan policy.").
212. E.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 205, at 346-47 (coining the descriptor of
"informal intercourse"); VON GLAHN, supra note 21, at 63 (describing the conduct of
business through unofficial, para-diplomatic, or private channels in replacement of
formal embassies); Attix, supra note 188, at 364 (explaining that unofficial relations
may include unofficial agreements and may be accompanied by an exchange of
representatives; without more, however, no legal effect arises).
For the distinct concept of implied recognition, see LAUTERPACHT, supra note 205,
at 371 (admonishing that the distillation of recognition from conduct is "particularly
inappropriate when the general attitude of the State in question points to its continued
determination to deny recognition"); Attix, supra note 188, at 379-85 (discussing trade
relations and implied recognition).
For arrangements between the U.S. and Taiwan, see, for example, U.S. DEpVT OF
STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: TAiWAN 7 (Oct. 1998) (noting that (1) the Taiwan

Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, created domestic legal authority for the conduct of U.S.Taiwan relations; (2) U.S. interaction with the people of Taiwan occurs through the
American Institute in Taiwan, a private non-profit corporation; (3) the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Representative Office offers the Taiwanese counterpart; and (4) the U.S.
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situation prevails in international organizations. 213
In sum, the picture of Taiwan's status appears multifaceted.
This observation reflects the decentralized nature of the international
legal system that does not provide for a single body to rule
authoritatively whether a particular entity meets the statehood
criteria. 214
A pragmatic approach counters that the exact
categorization of Taiwan within international law notions does not
seem dispositive for Taiwan's sustained role as a significant global
215
player.

IV. OUTLOOK: THE PATH FORWARD
At present, the various sides in the debate between the People's
2 16
Republic of China and Taiwan find it difficult to communicate.

has terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan but has continued the sale of
defensive military equipment to Taiwan).
213.
Taiwan is at present attempting to gain entry into the UN and the World
Trade Organization. Taiwan has participated in the Asian Development Bank and the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. For a snapshot of Taiwan's membership in
international organizations, see Hungdah Chiu, The InternationalLaw of Recognition
and the Status of the Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 193, 193 n.6 (1989); see also
Chang & Lim, supra note 131, at 425 (asserting that United Nations G.A. Res. 2758 of
1971 has already determined that there is only one China and that its legal
government is situated in Beijing). But see Lee, supra note 188, at 366 (opining that
the resolution does not explicitly recognize the sovereignty of the People's Republic of
China over Taiwan).
214.
E.g., Chiu, supra note 213, at 194-97 (offering that the decision is left to
individual states of the international community through the system of recognition);
Lee, supra note 188, at 366, 367 (finding that, "[ulnder the UN system, the
International Court of Justice is the only judicial organ which is in a position to pass
judgment upon the question of who has sovereignty over Taiwan").
215.
E.g., Attix, supra note 188, at 379 (finding that Taiwan's trading partners
are attempting to carry on relations with Taiwan in the way they always have); Chen,
supra note 1, at 254 (diagnosing that 'Taiwan is already a de facto sovereign nation');
Chiu, supra note 213, at 196 (suggesting that, in practice, nations such as the United
States, which do not officially recognize Taiwan as a de jure state, treat it as a de facto
state); Rosenblatt, supra note 202, at 798-800 (finding that (1) Taiwan is freely
pioneering in the management of a form of de facto independence, which has no name
but may achieve some degree of recognition; (2) despite its curious status, Taiwan
constitutes enough of a state to receive support against the threat of military attack,
conducts varying degrees of non-official, non-diplomatic relations with most nations of
the world, and represents an important economic factor with a major role in world
trade; and (3) in light of altered perceptions of sovereignty and independence, the world
community may one day conclude that Taiwan's non-status is essentially irrelevant to
the undeniable fact of its existence on the international scene and the rights of its
people).
216.
See Point-Counterpoint: The InternationalLegal Status of Taiwan, 1 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 320, 320 (1996-97) (opining that "proponents of 'One China'
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Although the finality scenario of reunification remains favored 2 17
over intermediary approaches,2 1 8 the controversy centers around the
political and economic organization of the future Chinese state. The
People's Republic of China and Taiwan exhibit significant differences
between their constitutional, legal and political systems, economies,
administrative and educational structures, and societies.2 19 The
former features a single-party government and a command-andcontrol economy still under development, whereas the latter boasts a
capitalistic society with a pluralistic legal and political system and a
free-wheeling economy. 220 Bridging the seemingly unbridgeable gap

may involve compromising between the contributions of each player
or adopting one of the existent system alternatives. The Government
of the People's Republic of China proffers the absorption of Taiwan
under the "one country-two systems" model as a middle-ground
approach. 2 21 In contrast, the Government of Taiwan insists that a
viable implementation process cannot be commenced unless the

rely on historical and cultural arguments while those in favor of Taiwanese autonomy
often... stress the legal basis for their claims").
217.
In contrast to the Taiwanese Constitution, the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China proffers a reunification and indivisibility clause, but, unlike the
German Basic Law, it does not provide a process mechanism. XIANFA [Constitution]
pmbl.para. 9 (1982), reprintedin 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 94, 95 (Amos J. Peaslee
ed., 1985); XIANFA art. 51, reprintedin 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra, at 94, 95.
218.
For an alternative model within the spectrum between independence and
reunification, see generally Rosenblatt, supra note 202, at 797 (discussing voluntary
compacts of freely associated states that allow for the preservation of sovereignty, the
retention of the right to self-determination and termination of the relationship, and
membership in international organizations).
219. See Edwin L.-C. Lai, The Economic Implications of the Reunification of
Hong Kong with China, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735. 737 (1997) (comparing the
systems of China and Hong Kong).
220. E.g., SUTTER, supra note 210, at 1, 6-9; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note
212, at 3-5.
221. For further discussions of the doctrine, see, for example, Cooney, supra note
179, at 497 (providing a critical examination of this approach based on autonomy and
accountability deficiencies); Huang & Qian, supra note 199, at 290 n.4, 327-28
(explaining that (1) "the dominant Confucianism in China's legal history has several
central precepts: ren [feeling of humanity], i [moral integrity], and li [customary rules
of proper individual and social conduct]"; (2) post-Deng Xiaoping China is gradually
entering a unique stage of legal development; (3) it will feature "three law families"
(civil law, common law, and socialist law systems) and "four compound (legal] regions";
(4) like other countries with federal systems, China-currently a non-federal system
country-will need to develop inter-regional conflicts rules; and (5)in order to mollify
those who doubt or resist the concept of "one country, two systems," the mainland
"mustformulate specific proposals that will accommodate the needs and concerns of all
of China's regions"); Lai, supra note 219, at 744 (observing that the idea of a "highly
independent economic entity but not a political or legal entity independent from
mainland China" represents a paradox to most Western academics and that "this
dualism could be sustained and eventually eliminated if China itself continues to
evolve in favor of the interests of the emerging capitalist class and its affiliated middle
class").
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mainland abandons its socialist system and embraces a democratic
form of government.2 2 2
A similar chasm had plagued German rapprochement. 2 23 By
agreeing to disagree, however, the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic were able to launch a viable
partnering mechanism that increased the permeability of the innerGerman border, facilitated German-German dialogue, and alleviated
the hardships of division. Even despite the osmosis effect generated
by the closer relationship, post-reunification Germany experienced
severe political, economic, and societal tremors. 224 Avoiding similar
disturbances may present the most formidable challenge involved
with creating a viable finality scenario for the Chinese nation.
Independent of a neat transfer of the particulars of the German
blueprint, 225 the responsible players may feel encouraged by the

222.
Cooney, supra note 179, at 507 n.49 (referring to Taiwan's Guidelines for
National Reunification); Fu, supra note 178, at 335 (emphasizing that most Chinese
dissidents who live abroad are opposed to the imposition of communist autocratic rule
on Taiwan). But see TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, pt. IV
(committing the People's Republic of China to a socialist system).
223.
Reimann, supra note 18, at 1994 (noting that four decades of membership
in opposing European blocs magnified the difficulties in German reunification).
224.
For a critical evaluation, see generally QUINT, supra note 136 (providing
that (1) Eastern legal, administrative, and institutional structures were replaced by
those of the West, without mutual adjustment or harmonization; (2) the civil service,
the judiciary, and the universities were restructured to conform with the Western
model, entailing the replacement of the majority of Eastern personnel by imports from
the West; (3) the issues associated with real property rights lost through communist
expropriation or by emigrants from the German Democratic Republic were settled very
much in favor of Western interests; (4) to the detriment of the Eastern economy,
Eastern production facilities were sold off or liquidated hastily, according to Western
market principles; (5) in early 1990 Western political parties and party politics already
had taken over East German election campaigns, marginalizing or eliminating the
grassroots organizations and citizens' alliances that had carried the 1989 revolution;
and (6) bureaucrats in Western ministries drafted the Treaty of Economic Union and
the Unification Treaty with very little Eastern input); McLaughlin, supra note 18, at
280 (analyzing German reunification and challenges associated with that process
against the backdrop of Jhering's plea for the feeling of legal right, Rechtsgefiihi, in his
The Struggle for Law, Kampf urns Recht).
225.
For a rejection of the application of the "two German states formula" to the
relationship between the mainland and Taiwan, see generally TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE,
WHITE PAPER, supra note 149 (arguing that (1) the German and Chinese cases differ in
their roots and nature, status under international law, and actual conditions of
existence; (2) the outcome of World War II and external factors drove and dominated
the German division into two states and reunification, while the Taiwan question arose
as a remnant of a civil war falling exclusively into China's internal affairs; (3) distinct
fates for Germany and China were stipulated in the applicable international treaties;
and (4) the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic, unlike
China and Taiwan, were geostrategically positioned in a Cold War hot spot). But see
Lilley & Waldron, supra note 7, at A22 (noting that, in the Chinese case, "a parallel
arrangement would be yi zhong liangguo ('one China, two states')).
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German experience that unencumbered creativity may in the long
term lead to results that were previously adjudged as inconceivable.
The Chinese affinity for treaty frameworks in the context of legal and
political arrangements may be honed to institutionalize levels of
mutual interaction and reinvigorate social, economic, trade, and
other exchanges. In this sense, the success of the Basic Treaty has
illustrated how the proportional relationship between increasing
contacts and decreasing tensions can effectively be brought to full
fruition.

